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Introduction 
Hello, and welcome to volwne two of Undercurrents. 
For this issue we have chosen the theme "Nature, Culture, Self." With this broad theme 
we hope to embrace three converging domains whose relationships to each other constitute 
the principal focus of inquiry within the interdisciplinary field of critical environmental 
thought. In attempting to explore and articulate a new view of the human place in nature, 
ecophilosophers and activists are frequently led to questions of the self and its relation to the 
world. This often includes questions of culture and its role in changing how we perceive of 
our relationship to non-human nature. These are difficult and uncertain questions, but ones 
with direct relevance to contemporary social and ecological urgencies. 
'The response to our call-for-papers was encouraging, and eclectic. The papers we have 
chosen for this issue reflect some of the variety of approaches to social change. In addition to 
the papers there is some artwork and poetry that we think will contribute to a further 
understanding of the relationships implied in our theme. 
The issue begins with Margot La Rocque's paper on human voice-overs in wildlife 
documentaries. By revealing the bad anthropomorphism of much of the narration within this 
genre, she points out that though these works appear to represent a sympathetic relation 
between humans and the rest of nature, often they merely continue to subvert the non-
human. 
In his paper, Jean-Marc Daigle reflects on his experience with a local project in order to 
discuss the importance and potential of urban wild places to inspire the growth and unfolding 
of human bonds with, and sensitivity to, the earth. 
Paul Nonnekes' paper is one which rewards effort. His poetic evocation of the child's 
experience of the earth is written in a style which complements the creative challenge of his 
message. 
Jacqueline Pearce's paper is a comparative discussion of how three of the transformative 
branches of the environmental movement -- deep ecology, social ecology and eco-feminism -
- conceptualize an "ecological self." 
In her paper, Nancy O'Sullivan provides a critical assessment of the different approaches 
that have been taken toward establishing an ethical position for the relationship of humans 
to animals. She argues that conventional philosophical approaches are inadequate to the task. 
Once again there are a nwnber of people who deserve thanks for their assistance in getting 
Undercurrents published. We therefore would like to sincerely acknowledge the support of 
Dean Edward Spence and the Faculty of Environmental Studies for giving us a home, Frances 
Chan for her guidance through the computer maze, and Andre and the folks at Our Times 
for their friendly and professional printing services. Kim Armitage, Julia Murphy, Jackie 
Pearce, Craig Naherniak and Judith Fraser all worked on the journal committee until other 
commitments took them away from us, and we thank them for the time they gave to 
Undercurrents. 
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Finally, we would like to thank you for reading and supporting Undercurrents. We have 
received a substantial number of supportive letters from those of you who read volume one. 
This encouragement bas meant a lot to us. We appreciate your critical and constructive 
comments; they help us guide Undercurrents in a direction that will allow us to make student 
work accessible and relevant to a wider audience of activists, scholars and concerned people. 
Graduate students interested in contributing to Undercurrents should consult the editorial 
policy in the inside back cover. 
Undercurrents is published and administered entirely by graduate student volunteers, 
operating on the principle of group consensus in decision making. There is no editor-in-chief, 
and no hierarchy of responsibilities; the journal is published with a process that reflects the 
social vision Undercurrents seeks to promote. This is not easy, but the group feels that process 
is just as important as the results of our work. 
We hope you erijoy this issue. Please tell your friends and colleagues about us. 
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Speaking Animals: 
NOTES ON THE HUMAN VOICEOVER IN WILDLIFE DOCUMENTARIES 
Nature conservationists have often credited 
wildlife documentaries with doing much to awaken 
public environmental concern. But these assertions 
have given too little critical thought to what I take to 
be a central problem: the failure of such programs to 
address what we might term issues of ideology. 
Wildlife documentaries present a view of the world in 
which such issues are deliberately kept under-
developed, and are isolated conceptually from other · 
social and political domains. We need then to ask the 
following questions: In what ways do these documen-
taries serve to legitimate existing human relationships 
with the nonhuman? And how do they affect our 
perception of, and our willingness to take action on, 
environmental problems? 
Unforhmately, the history of wildlife filmmaking 
remains largely undocumented--conspicuously absent 
from historical and critical studies of film, television, 
and environmentalism. To begin this discussion, I 
have therefore chosen to focus rather narrowly on the 
function of the human voiceover to suppress a serious 
inquiry into patterns of human domination, while 
simultaneously claiming to speak on behalf of the 
nonhuman. I will attempt to sketch the various ways 
in which this voice authorizes and sustains a limited 
number of relationships between human and non-
human nature: by speaking through animals, about 
animals, or for animals, but rarely as animal. 
• • • 
The very concept of 'wildlife' is both a product 
and an expression of the physical and cultural mar-
ginalisation of the nonhuman in our society. 'Wild-
life' names nature as wild, as Other--not only as other 
than domesticated life, but as other than human life. 
* 
by Margot La Rocque * 
As Roderick Nash has noted in his history of the idea 
of wilderness: 
Until there were domesticated 
animals it was impossible to 
distinguish them from wild ones. 
Until there were fenced fields and 
walled cities 'wilderness' had no 
meaning. Everything was simply 
habitat, which man shared with other 
creatures.1 
The notion of a wildlife fll.m or wildlife tele-
VlSion documentary (and I am going to collapse the 
two media here for brevity's sake) serves then to 
underscore at least two disjunctures: the gulf be-
tween wildlife, on the one hand, and human life and 
social practices on the other, and the gulf between 
this highly conventionalized genre and other types of 
programming. 
It may seem odd to begin a discussion of 
wildlife documentaries by privileging the audible over 
the visible, and the human over the nonhuman, but 
let us consider the following points. First, the dis-
embodied (usually male) voiceover is most charac-
teristic of this genre. It is this voice, I would argue, 
that is primarily responsible for guiding the apparent 
haphazardness of natural events toward an intended 
meaning. As Mary Ann Doane has noted of the 
voiceover in television documentaries and news pro-
grams in general, it normally "carries the burden of 
'information' while the impoverished image simply 
fills the screen."2 Second, this voiceover tends to 
establish a 'complicity' between itself and the spec-
tator: together they understand and thus place the 
nonhuman as subject to the human. Indeed, the 
term 'voiceover' names a particular hierarchical 
relation not only between sound and image, but 
Margot La Rocque is completing her Master in Environmental Studies at York University. She teaches part-time in the 
Division of Social Science at York, and part-time in the Film and Television Program at Humber College. She worked for a 
number of years as a documentary filmmaker -- most recently as a researcher for the National Film Board's Who Gets In? An 
Inside Look at Canada's Immigration System (1989). 
This paper was first presented at the 15th Annual Conference on Social Theory, Politics and the Arts, co-sponsored 
by York University and the University of Ottawa (Glendon College, Toronto, October 6-8, 1989). It is abbreviated from a 
work in progress tentatively entitled Imaging Animals: Essays on the Representation of the Nonhuman in the Twentieth 
Century. 
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between human and nonhuman. When confronted 
with the essential muteness of the nonhuman--a 
condition which we as speaking animals are very 
likely to interpret as a condition of lack--three major 
modes of address emerge (as I have suggested above): 
(1) To speak through animals: here the 
human voice substitutes for the non-
human voice, effectively erasing it, in 
order not to speak of Nature, but rather 
of human society; 
(2) To speak about animals: here the 
human voice subjects the nonhuman to 
naming and questioning; and 
(3) To speak for animals: here we en-
deavour to speak on behalf of those who 
are 'needy' and cannot speak. 
I will concentrate in this abbreviated paper on the 
fll'st mode. 
Speaking Through Animals 
Walt Disney's Bear Country, an Academy 
award-winning live-action short subject produced in 
1953 as part of the True-Life Adventure series (and 
recently re-released by the Disney corporation) seems 
to offer a virtual textbook illustration of speaking 
through animals. Here the voiceover turns animals 
into human characters that are not unlike characters 
of the silent cinema, with their exaggerated gestures 
and 'voices' severed from the image of their bodies. 
Briefly, Bear Country tells the story of two 
years in the life of two male bear cubs, beginning 
with their emergence from the den a few weeks after 
birth in early spring, and ending with their achieve-
ment of adulthood in the late autumn of their second 
year. The narrative is organized around the central-
ity of the family unit, with the mother bear medi-
ating between the cubs and the rest of the world. 
(Father bear is all but absent, but more on that in a 
moment.) The natural world envisioned here is 
merely a clever disguise for the human world, in 
which rules for child-rearing have been translated 
into 'laws of nature.' 
The process of growing up proceeds in fits and 
starts, as the cubs enter into conflict with many 
other species, and with various external circumstan-
ces. Out of a condition of union with all species ("the 
young of all species get along" claims the narrator), 
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through close encounters with coyotes, a rattlesnake, 
and a mountain lion--to name just three--the cubs 
gain enough experience and training from their 
mother in order to understand their difference from, 
and even opposition to, other species. The film ends 
with the mother bear chasing her yearling cubs out 
onto a limb, literally, and abandoning them, counting 
on two years of discipline to keep them there. At 
first, the cubs wait obediently for Mother to return, 
but torn between their fear of her reprisal and 
growing hunger pangs, they eventually gain enough 
confidence to consider their own needs over their 
mother's wishes, and climb down from the treetop. 
This descent marks their clear achievement of adult-
hood, as their sense of self is now delineated not only 
in opposition to other species, but finally in opposition 
to Mother as well. The passage from infancy to 
adulthood--with its recurrent feelings of struggle, 
empowerment, abandonment, and nostalgia--is thus 
condensed for the young human spectator not only to 
a period of two years, as in a bear's life, but further 
digested to fit the twenty minutes or so it takes to 
view the film. 
Now, in the course of viewing this film, the 
voiceover steers the young human spectator through 
two distinct phases that are somewhat analogous to 
the developmental phases of the maturing bear cubs. 
First, it encourages the child to identify with all the 
species presented on the screen, and then it orients 
him3 toward a more 'objective' perception of reality. 
Let me elaborate. 
In the early part of the f!.lm, bear country is 
presented primarily as like-human country, with its 
requisite cast of stereotypical characters and human-
like occurrences. For the young human spectator, the 
process of self-recognition is aided by the cubs' 
natural affmity for play, and the insistence of the 
voiceover on the similarity of all animal young. It is 
only through the cumulative information provided by 
the commentary that the young spectator slowly 
learns to distinguish the characteristics of bears from 
other nonhuman species, and ultimately from his own 
species. 
For example, as the fllm progresses, the 
actions of the bears become more and more exag-
gerated and corny--indeed, subhuman like. The 
commentary increasingly mocks the young cubs, 
comparing them in one long sequence for instance to 
heavyweight wrestlers: 
These contenders seem to be battling 
for the heavyweight title. The cham-
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pion meanwhile watches from the side-
lines. 'Dead-lock', 'hammer-lock', 'half-
Nelson'-they've got all the holds down 
pat. The title holder views the proceed-
ings with bored disdain. But the small-
fry watch with the fascination of hero 
worship. And whenever they get the 
chance, they're quick to try the tricks of 
the trade on each other. 
The cubs never completely grow up. In the final 
scene I have described above, where the cubs have 
been abandoned by their mother, a lullaby rocks the 
young bears to sleep in their "tree-top cradles" desp-
ite the commentary's insistence that they have ach-
ieved adulthood 
Bear Country offers the young spectator a 
mirror of a part of himself that he is longing to 
outgrow, at the same time that it encoW'ages him to 
make fun of the antics of those who will always be 
even sillier than he is. The drawing power of a fllm 
like Bear Country may thus be seen to lie in this 
twin capacity to engage the young spectator in a 
process of identification with the young cubs at the 
same time that it provides the vehicle for him to be 
able to stand outside or, more precisely, ouer the non-
human, in a relation that cannot help but feel like 
one of mastery. 
"To cast the rest of nature in OW' image", as 
the natW'alist John Livingston observes--even, I might 
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add, the image of an eight year old child--of COW'se 
virtually guarantees the supremacy of the human 
species. Livingston writes: 
We judge wildlife species by human 
standards in order to find them want-
ing in human qualities so that they 
may be appropriately ranked and 
filed. Because our standards are 
specific to us, no other species can 
possibly meet them. Man is thus the 
rational measure of all things; the 
proof is universal, and the perceived 
hierarchy is flrm. 4 
Bear Country is doubly interesting from OW' 
present point of view in that such an evolution from 
infancy to adulthood--or from a magical identification 
with other species to all-knowing master of all species 
--also parallels a progression in the history of wild-
life documentaries from Disney, let us say, to David 
Attenborough, and an informal hierarchy within 
wildlife programming (where we rank films which 
appeal to science as higher than films which sen-
timentally pursue human likeness in the nonhuman). 
In Bear Country, the authority of even the 
mother bear is ultimately supplanted by the authority 
of the human male: a rational, disembodied voice 
able to interpret the actions of both mother and cubs 
--indeed all species--and thus able to claim omnis-
cience. (The absent Father bear only aids this super-
session.) 
When we 'progress' from speaking through 
animals to speaking about animals, we shift from a 
voice that freely describes the ways in which natW'e 
is like-self, to a voice which names for us a natW'e 
which is more like-object.5 To speak about animals, 
then, is to submit that a neutral state of language 
exists, from which would flow other, inferior lang-
uages, such as the anthropomorphic language of Bear 
Country, or those mediated by individual conscious-
ness. OW' inclination then is to accept this seemingly 
neutral or transparent language as the superior one, 
and employ it even when we attempt to speak on 
behalf of, or for, the nonhuman. 
Speaking For Animals 
"I think the birds here in Massachusetts 
disappeared simply because of civilization," says an 
'expert' in a fllm on the reintroduction of bald eagles. 
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"Without such forests, many creatures would simply 
cease to exist, • claims Marlin Perkins in an episode of 
Wild Kingdom.6 
We, as individuals, are irmocent, then. As 
Graeme Turner argues in an uncommon article on 
wildlife television documentaries, the depredations of 
humankind become natural forces like flood and flre. 
''The threat to the species is seen as the mechanism 
of nature in remorseless operation, something for 
which no one person can be held responsible, and 
something which flows from the domination of the 
species, not the individual." 7 On the rare occasion 
where specific destructive acts are spoken of, they are 
inevitably the actions of citizens of 'developing' 
cotultries. According to Turner, the species under 
threat is then offered sympathy and token help: zoos, 
nature reserves, etc. Turner compares these sorts of 
ameliorative gestures to a humanist act which, like 
the taking of refugees, tries to avoid the political act: 
"dealing with the source of the refugees. 118 The source 
of the problem here, of course, lies primarily in the 
conflict between the needs of the nonhuman and the 
wants of people. But these are precisely the sorts of 
issues which are deflected by vague notions of the 
"fragility" and "interrelatedness of Nature." The 
voiceover denounces "Man" just enough to pay lipser-
vice to biological conservation, but fails to truly serve 
conservation by offering us a critique of, for instance, 
the consumer ethos, scientism, or the notion of 
progress. 
Insofar as it is generally issued from the fleld 
of corporate sponsorship, under the pretext of object-
ive knowledge, the voiceover must refrain from identi-
fying the actions of any particular person or group--
the documentary could therefore not be trusted. The 
voiceover must not age; it must be incontestable. 
What speaks then is what Pascal Bonitzer terms the 
"anonymity of 'public service,' of television, of infor-
mation in general "9 It "neither is supposed to be, 
nor can be, a burning voice, • writes Bonitzer of such 
a voice. 10 A near empty plea vaguely reiterates the 
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great abstractions of "Man" and "Nature." But it is 
not truly charged with representing the nonhuman in 
its otherness; on the contrary, it is charged with 
fixing it. It censors questions of why this destruc-
tion occurs (for they are variable and exist only in 
human consciousness) and concentrates only on what 
we cannot doubt: the number of square kilometers 
a certain creature requires, for instance. The fre-
quently used closing image of some threatened 
creature soaring majestically against an expanse of 
sky shows nothing of the exploitation of the non-
human world; it is only a glimpse of a world which 
can exist today only on the screen. 
• • • 
Looking back at the numerous claims that 
have been made about the capacity of the wildlife 
genre to be yoked to the efforts of conservation and 
its contemporary variant, environmentalism, what I 
fmd striking is the enormous consistency in state-
ments spanning over eight decades of unmitigated, 
incessant environmental destruction. One of the 
principal tenets of our society, as David Ehrenfeld 
notes, is the belief that "all problems are soluble"--
and, more specifically, all problems are soluble by 
people.11 To the long list of humanistic and techno-
cratic assumptions Ehrenfeld cites, clearly we must 
add the assumption that the media can be used to 
solve the ecological crisis. However, one further 
observation is in order to temper this blind optimism. 
At its core, the yearning to make wildlife 
documentaries--and to watch and listen to these 
documentaries--seems to be an urge to make nature 
whole: to disengage ourselves from the whole com-
plex of social and natural relationships, and project a 
phantasy of unity and even purity onto the natural 
world. 
But this desire leaves us with a number of 
dilemmas (indeed, environmentalism is riddled with 
such dilemmas). How can we confront an external 
reality--i.e. speak of environmental destruction--while 
simultaneously wanting to take refuge in this increas-
ingly illusory unity? How can we take pleasure in 
the wildlife spectacle without becoming egoistically 
thrilled with the grandeur of our own sweeping 
vision? And finally, how can we speak on behalf of 
those who cannot speak, without erasing their voices, 
or mastering them? I will briefly address this last 
question now. 
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From the stories of Ernest Thompson Seton 
through to the cinematic tales of a fierce and savage 
Africa, and the more tame specular entertainment of 
Disney, virtually all early attempts to bring 'nature' 
to a mass audience have been indicted for their 
failure of objectivity--for the imposition of human 
feelings, ambitions, and fears onto the nonhuman 
world. Indeed, it was often argued that the very 
success of a popular nature movement hinged on the 
construction of a better--i.e. more objective, more 
grown up--way of seeing the nonhuman, divested of 
all narrative or poetic elaboration. Doubtless there 
was merit in the critique of sham natural history, 
given the banalities that have been levied on the 
nonhuman world. But doubtless there was also 
comfort to be found in the drawing of analogies 
between human and nonhuman worlds--in what the 
naturalist-writer John Burroughs described nostal-
gically as the "pretty little anthropomorphic view of 
things."l2 
Clearly, Disney's Bear Country was the material 
product of an era of filmmaking in which heavy 
cameras and insensitive f1lm stocks demanded a well-
lit, studio-like situation, and therefore trained, or at 
the very least, captive, animals. In the context of 
most contemporary work, it appears the relic of a 
period characterized by the unscrupulous bending of 
natural facts and rampant anthropomorphisms, 
despite the f1lm's insistence thp.t "Nature is the 
dramatist" here.13 But what are we to make of the 
fact that these True-Life Adventures are oft-recol-
lected with fondness and vividness by biologists and 
non-:>pecialists alike? Paradoxically, a type of f1lm 
which is disdainfully rejected by modern sensibilities 
for being the epitome of falsehood or childishness, 
would seem to have engendered an empathetic 
relationship with the nonhuman world of such 
potency that many specific scenes are often recalled 
decades after they were originally viewed.14 In 
opposing cinematic truth to anthropomorphic repre-
sentation then--as f1lms which profess to speak ahout 
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nature do--we may be guilty of the same perverse 
logic as Samuel Scudder was in 1870, when he 
declared in the annual report of the Boston Society of 
Natural History that professionals "should 'popularize 
science'--not by degrading it but by divesting it of its 
mysteries, by elevating the popular knowledge to our 
own standard."15 
Granted, the cinematic apparatus was 
dreamt of and invented under the shadow of positi-
vism. It supported the premise that nature is know-
able, objectifiable, uncontaminated by human vision. 
But as a language, the dominant cinema developed in 
a way that we can only describe as fundamentally 
anthropomorphic: based on human dimensions of 
time and space, and the spectator's fascination with 
his or her likeness on the screen. As such, the 
imperatives of wildlife dOcumentaries drag us in two 
contradictory directions: toward scientism and 
objectivity on the one hand, and toward anthropo-
morphic representation on the other. However, if we 
are to respond more adequately to the current 
ecological crisis--although I am not sure there is an 
adequate response--the challenge would seem to me 
to lie not in speaking about animals (concerned 
fllmmakers often claim what is needed is "better 
science"), or even in speaking for animals, but rather 
in attempting to subvert the discourses of human 
mastery, and learning to speak as animals. 
• • • 
I would like to digress for a moment, to close 
with matters of more practical concern. 16 I have 
gathered a number of recommendations here, drawing 
in many instances on the unpublished proceedings of 
the International Wildlife Film Festival (IWFF), held 
annually on the U Diversity of Montana campus at 
Missoula. I hesitate to set them forth, for I am afraid 
they are so small and ultimately what is required is 
something far greater than better representations; but 
to suggest nothing can be done to speak effectively as 
animals is to shy away from the challenge. 
First, I believe we need programs that do not 
separate the human and nonhuman, and that seek 
out relationships between the two that are lived, not 
abstracted. As I have suggested above, a reevaluation 
of the concept of anthropomorphism would likely lead 
us to more engaging representations of the non-
human. When our ideas of the nonhuman are satur-
ated with scientific fact, is it no wonder that we turn 
to images of alien creatures and Care Bears to mirror 
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ourselves? 
Secondly, we need to hear the burning voices 
of people privileged to live in close contact with the 
natural world. As the deep ecologist Arne Naess has 
argued: 
When biologists refrain from using the 
rich and flavorful language of their own 
spontaneous experience of all life forms-
-not only of the spectacularly beautiful 
but of the mundane and bizarre as well-
-they support the value nihilism which is 
implicit in outrageous environmental 
policies. 17 
If we must have celebrities and exemplary witnesses 
as authorities to guide our mediated explorations of 
the natural world, then at least let them be selected 
from those who have written lovingly, knowingly, and 
intimately of the natural world. 
A third suggestion is that we need to hear from 
completely other voices. For instance, in his intro-
duction to an address by Edward Abbey at the IWFF 
in 1982, Doug Peacock asked the audience to imagine 
"a Blackfoot film on bison made a hundred years 
ago."18 Our continuing fascination with the lone 
white male in the wilderness suggests that we have 
yet to come up with a satisfying model for 'nature 
loving' in our documentaries. 
A final suggestion is that we need to have more 
programs that seek to address some of the root 
causes of the ecological crisis. I offer that a truly 
radical conservation documentary would construct and 
counterpose a voice that is simultaneously burning 
and lucidly argued, intensely personal and political. 
Of work already produced, I believe the Canadian 
Broadcasting Corporation's 1985 series A Planet for 
the Taking comes the closest to achieving these objec-
tives. 
There are, of course, many other possibilities, 
but to go on at length here with these prescriptions 
would be to suggest that I believe that there is a 
solution to environmental problems through mediated 
communication--i.e. through better representations, 
better programming, etc.--and that we do not ultim-
ately want to wrap ourselves in a blanket of tech-
nology, of which the ftlm and television industry is 
surely a part. 
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I would like to thank Ray Parker for bis helpful comments 
on this paper. 
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Towards An Urban Ecological Consciousness: 
EXPERIENCING WILD PLACES IN THE CITY 
The chaos of weeds growing in an 'emp-
ty' lot is now recognised for its essential, 
almost intelligent role in the planetary 
homeostasis .... We begin to glimpse some-
thing of the uncanny coherence of en-
veloping nature, a secret meaningfulness 
too often obscured by our abstractions. 
This wild proliferation is not a random 
chaos but a coherent community of forms, 
an expressive universe that moves ac-
cording to a diverse logic very different 
from that logic we attempt to impose. 1 
I. Introduction 
The "Green City"2 has in recent years emerged 
as an integrated conceptual framework with which to 
respond locally to the global environmental crisis. In 
theory, a Green City is "in harmony with ecosystems 
that support it, and ... contains a populace that con-
siders itself a part of the biosphere and acts accord-
ingly."3 The concept, in short, addresses the need for 
our society to respectfully build with, rather than 
impose upon, the land and the natural world. 
The restoration, rehabilitation, and preservation 
of natural diversity and complexity within urban/sub-
urban open spaces4 is gradually becoming an accepted 
means to literally "green" the city. To this end, an 
ecological approach is used in the design and main-
tenance of open spaces, resulting in what some have 
called an ecological landscape or "aesthetic."5 Through 
this approach, natural processes determine the spirit, 
character, and appearance of urban open spaces. This, 
of course, goes against the philosophy of traditional 
landscaping practices. These employ a strictly main-
tained, horticulturally defmed and designed order 
which suppresses the land's and people's natural 
impulses. Werner N ohl reveals the tensions and 
implicit values that underlie the contrasting ap-
proaches to the creation of urban landscapes: 
* 
by Jean-Marc Daigle * 
Open spaces that are presented as 
valuable and unalterable works of art 
will always remain somehow alien ... 
[E]nvironments in which we do not 
allow nature to intervene continuous-
ly may express the "genus architecti," 
but the genus loci will certainly be 
absent. It is the interplay between 
users and natural processes that gives 
a place its special character. Together, 
they successfully produce an impres-
sion of the totality of nature in urban 
open spaces. 6 
A natural urban open space, free to evolve 
outside of human domination and manipulation, 
aquires a quality that transcends appearances. It 
becomes wild. As such, wild places are not merely 
aesthetic adjuncts to the human and humanized 
urban environment; they are intrinsically valuable 
expressions of the natural world that so often dis· 
appear beneath the pavement and beyond our con-
sciousness. Wild urban places offer people the oppor-
tunity to experience nature within the context of 
their own lives, in proximity of their homes, rather 
than in special faraway places. A wild place within 
the city may be sensed or experienced as an expres-
sion of the natural world which, in turn, envelops the 
city. Through such encounters, we begin to acquire 
insights into our existence in the natural world 
where we must learn to dwell. 
It has been suggested that the preservation of 
wild places in the context of the Green City rep-
resents one means of undertaking the "process of 
reconciliation between humans and nature. "7 In this 
paper, I explore this possibility and seek to develop a 
philosophical rationale for creating wild places in the 
city. The discussion emerges from my own reflections 
and experiences as a landscape architect and environ-
mental "thinker" and educator involved in a project 
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oriented towards the preservation of a wild place in 
the City of North York, Ontario. 
TI. Towards an Ecological Consciousness 
The global ecological crisis is, I think, essentially 
a crisis of consciousness underlying present human/ 
nature relations. Within our Western culture we have 
philosophically, morally and consciously extricated 
ourselves from nature. We perceive ourselves as a 
separate and dominant species. Armed with our 
objective, "value free" scientific view of the world, 
nature is rationalized so that "it is now possible to 
regard the world as a composite of neutral material."8 
This view represents a conscious denial of nature's 
eternal presence as "a substantial surrounding reality, 
... that is palpable as well as mystical, creative, life-
producing, and life-sustaining." 9 
From our pedestal, the natural world becomes 
but a collection of objects, a storehouse of resources 
and space needed for the development of a "progress-
ive", humanized world. Consequently, we no longer 
perceive ourselves as dwelling in a whole, living, 
interconnected and natural world. As John Livingston 
suggests, we have lost our sense of place in nature: 
[O]ur sense of belonging in nature, our 
sense of a place in nature, has been 
utterly destroyed ... having wilfully ab-
dicated our place in the life process, we 
can no longer remember that "place" 
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means "belonging", and that belonging 
is what living is all about.10 
The deleterious effects of our loss of place are 
now clearly evidenced in the many manifestations of 
environmental degradation. Clearly, our survival, and 
that of all other life forms, now depends on our 
ability to collectively move towards a more careful, 
respectful, and meaningful existence on the land and 
in nature. This may be possible through the cult iva-
tion of "an ecological consciousness."11 
At the core of an ecological consciousness lies 
a profound, empathetic and spiritual sensitivity to the 
natural world in which we are immersed. The cult-
ivation of an ecological consciousness is a process of, 
... becoming more aware of the actu-
ality of rocks, wolves, trees, and rivers 
--the cultivation of the insight that 
everything is connected ... .It is learn-
ing to be more receptive, trusting, 
holistic in perception, and is grounded 
in a vision of non-exploitive science 
and technology. 12 
An ecological consciousness is attuned to the natural 
rhythms, cycles and processes of the land and "the 
continuum of Nature, and .. only when we are con-
sciously aware of this shared continuum and actively 
engaged in its processes can we attain all that life 
has to offer to our existence."13 This heightened 
awareness allows us to exist in, rather than apart 
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from or above, nature, and we become "'plain citizen-
[s]' of the biosphere, not its conqueror[s] or manag-
er[s)."14 Through the process of acquiring an ecol-
ogical consciousness, we undertake the long journey 
back to our place in nature. 
As our sense of place in nature grows, it 
becomes possible to structure a mode of dwelling 
grounded in a sensitive, caring, and careful existence. 
In what he calls the "Human Homecoming", Joseph 
Grange defmes this mode of dwelling as, 
... an essential and authentic way of being 
human. That way is an existence that 
opens itself to nature rather than aggress-
ively reconstructing it according to per-
sonal ends. [W]e seek to dwell so that we 
can move nearer to that which resides 
hidden at the center of our selves: being 
itself which speaks to us through the hid-
denness of earth and the openness of 
world. 
To come home is therefore to 
undertake a way of relating to nature that 
allows nature to show itself to us and that 
encourages us to abide and take up 
residence in that meaning. Home is the 
concernful region where earth, body and 
the world work to gather into nearness 
that which requires our preserving care. 
This is the journey unto care that every 
human being must undertake.15 [author's 
emphasis] 
The Urban Dilemma 
An ecological consciousness is grounded in a 
lived awareness of the natural world as an enveloping 
totality. Nature is not merely encountered intellec-
tually, as an abstract idea. but empathetically, as a 
subject--a living, interconnected and interdependent 
whole. Within cities, it is difficult to know nature in 
this way. The city is generally depicted as an entirely 
human entity separate from and void of nature. For 
example, Jerry Mander paints a rather bleak picture 
of the city in his discussion on the "walling of aware-
ness": 
[W]hen we live in cities, no experience is 
directly between us and the planet. Vir-
tually all experience is mediated in some 
way. Concrete covers whatever would 
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grow from the ground. Buildings 
block the natural vistas. The water 
we drink comes from a faucet, not 
from a stream or the sky. All foliage 
has been confined by human con-
siderations and redesigned according 
to human tastes. There are no wild 
animals, there are no rocky terrains, 
there is no cycle of bloom and de-
cline. There is not even night and 
day.l6 
Mander's description of our mediated ex-
periences within urban environments suggests that 
the city is not likely to inspire a shift towards an 
ecological consciousness. This very real and disturbing 
possibi.fity creates the urban dilem.ma: urban dwellers, 
who are most strongly encouraged by the popular 
media and other institutions to "care" for the "en-
vironment", are least likely to conceptualize the 
"environment" as whole nature and hence a subject 
worthy of care.17 
Nature is indeed obscured and suppressed by 
the humanized urban world. Yet, to believe that 
nature can be known only outside of the city, in 
entirely natural environments or in wilderness, fuels 
the misconception that cities exist outside of nature. 
Nature can, and often does manifest itself in the city, 
in those untended places so often dismissed as va-
cant, empty, undeveloped, or unused, where wildness 
has rooted 
Here, in a moment of willingness and open-
ness, nature can be experienced in its totality. If the 
city dweller is to develop a care and concern for 
nature through the cultivation of an ecological con-
sciousness, such experiences must be encouraged. But 
ftrst, the person must learn to see and know nature 
in all of its manifestations, in commonplace and 
seemingly insignificant embodiments. 
ill. Knowing Nature 
Within our culture, nature has become an 
abstract concept, too often associated only with those 
special, exemplary embodiments that seem to exist 
only outside of the city and the human influence. 
Nature, known this way, is an object, the sum of its 
objects. 
From this perspective, we quantitatively and 
qualitatively evaluate natural landscapes according to 
their specialness on the basis of objective, scientific, 
Vol. 2, 1990 
aesthetic, geological or other criteria For example, in 
the Province of Ontario, "natural areas" worthy of 
preservation are labelled "Areas of Natural and 
Scientific Interest", and are defmed as, 
... environmentally sensitive or significant 
areas ... that have been chosen by the 
Ministry of Natural Resources as most 
significant from a provincial 
perspective .... In a practical sense, natural 
areas are usually good examples of vegeta-
tion communities or wildlife habitat, or 
areas where one or more rare species or 
geologically significant landform features 
of some kind are found. 18 
We must indeed preserve such areas, for they 
are powerful and evocative reminders of the natural 
world and the life-force. We must not, however, take 
the totality of nature to be wholly contained within 
the objective qualities of its most significant embodi-
ments, nor should we deny other, seemingly less sig-
nificant manifestations their intrinsic worth. 
Unfortunately, I fear that many urban people 
who visit conservation areas will mistakenly concep-
tualize nature as the objective contents of these 
special, rare, or unique places. Nature will be seen 
and conceived as objects on the landscape rather than 
experienced as a whole, enveloping totality that 
transcends the arbitrary boundaries of the conserva-
tion area. These people will return to the city where, 
in the absence of these specially designated land-
scapes, nature will be out of sight and, I presume, 
out of consciousness. Known solely through its objec-
tive qualities, nature is thus denied its wholeness as 
the context for our existence. 
In order to see and know nature whole, we 
begin by exchanging our role as passive, objective 
landscape viewers for a subjective and participatory 
mode of encounter. Our feelings, emotions, impres-
sions, and insights become as relevant and important 
as the objective qualities which elicit these respon-
ses. 
By looking/experiencing beyond the superficial 
objective, physical qualities of a wild landscape's 
features, we begin to perceive wildness. It is this 
expression of the life-force that flows through and 
beyond the landscape, linking the past with the 
future through the present. 
A natural landscape need not be special, u-
nique, or rare to elicit such a sensory and conscious 
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awareness of nature. While wilderness areas are 
indeed magnificent, they are of the same essence 
which inspires a "weed" to set roots in pavement--
both are of the same life-force. To know the weed 
this way, as an embodiment of the totality of nature, 
we cannot simply encounter it as a meaningless, 
troublesome object; we must experience it as a 
subject, not merely as it meets the eye, but as it 
touches the soul.19 
The Experience of Nature as Subject 
From within contemporary Western culture, 
the natural world is known as a collection of eco-
nomic, scientific, aesthetic or recreational resources 
whose value and potential is defmed solely by human 
needs and preferences. In the process, we have, as 
Evernden puts it, transformed "the planet from a 
world of living subjects to one of extended matter, 
passive porridge to be rearranged by human dic-
tate.''20 John Fowles suggests that this need to derive 
some form of use or "personal yield" from these 
resources contributes to our alienation from nature: 
[W]e shall never fully understand 
nature (or ourselves), and certainly 
never respect it, until we disassociate 
the wild from the notion of usability. 
For it is the general uselessness of so 
much of nature that lies at the root of 
our ancient hostility and indifference 
to it. 21 
This conscious denial of nature's subjectivity 
and intrinsic worth is a consequence of the tendency 
to base our understanding of nature upon scientific 
abstraction and the study of nature's objective qual-
ities. The foundations for this empirical view of the 
natural world, Evernden suggests, lie in "Galileo's 
demand that nature be known through mathematics 
rather than merely through human experience and 
sensation."22 We must, in essence, emotionally extir-
pate ourselves from nature in order to study, under-
stand, and use it. 
Thus removed from, and insensitive to, na-
ture's subjects, we are hard pressed to nurture a 
caring and respectful attitude towards the natural 
world. As geographer Allen Carlson suggests, "the 
landscape contains many objects that have deter-
minate forms, [and] if the attention is directed speci-
fically to them, we no longer have what ... is called the 
love of nature."23 
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We can begin to care for and love nature only 
when we become aware of ourselves as part of its 
totality. Nature is not just "out there" in the objec-
tive landscape; nature, in its essence, resides within 
us. After all, we and the natural world are of the 
same, living stuff. This insight into our own nature 
becomes possible when we can, in moments of clarity 
and openness, "strip our consciousness of its rational 
presuppositions,"24 so that we may begin, 
... to see the interrelations that span and 
connect human being and nature. We are 
not "outsiders" looking in, nor are we 
intellectual voyeurs "peeping" at nature 
through our analytic tools. We are f:trst of 
all being human--an activity that involves 
intimacy with nature since we, too, are 
natural. 25 
Through subjective experiences as insiders, we 
begin to know the natural world as the context of 
our existence, wherein we may dwell in place. Known 
this way, nature becomes a subject of our care and 
respect. 
In a subjective experience, we see beyond our 
"rational presuppositions." We encounter the world 
as it presents itself to us in our own experiences. 
This, of course, is in direct contrast to the present 
situation where we "no longer trust personal observ-
ation, even of the self-evident, until it is confll'IDed by 
scientific or technological institutions." 26 The sub-
jective experience is entirely personal: "[T]he person 
works to discover the world for himself [sic], to meet 
it authentically: his [sic) aim is to see the world as it 
is in his [sic) own fashion--not as other people tell 
him [sic) it is."27 
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A subjective experience is characterized by 
moments of "heightened contact" wherein the person's 
conscious attention and awareness is directed entirely 
towards the world at hand. In such moments, 
... the person feels a serenity of mood 
and a vividness of presence; his [sic] 
awareness of himself [sic] is heighten-
ed, and at the same time, the exter-
nal world seems more real. 26 
Such instances of heightened awareness and clarity of 
insight have been, over the ages, the stuff of poetic 
imagination for people seeking truth and meaning 
through environmental encounters. In the subjective 
experience, a person can develop "a deep appreciation 
of the unique qualities of landscapes, although achiev-
ing its fullest possibilities requires creative effort and 
the exercise of imagination." 29 
In subjective experiences of nature, the objec-
tive landscape is transformed. We become aware of 
the natural world as a place of other beings' ex-
periences. As momentary insiders in this other world 
of natural places and rhythms, we begin to under-
stand something of our own nature. Such insights are 
not, in and of themselves, derived simply from our 
admiration of natural things; they emerge from a 
profound awareness of the life-force that underlies 
nature's embodiments and the totality of the natural 
world. 
Wilderness, Wildness, and the Life-force 
The life-force is an essence and therefore not 
directly seen in the landscape, nor is it entirely 
contained in or by natural objects. Rather, it is that 
which gives rise to, and hence underlies, all that is 
naturally manifested and embodied, including our-
selves. The life-force is that which unifies the whole 
natural world and is perhaps best understood as the 
mystery of nature, life and the universe. 
Through the rise of the sciences, the life-
force has been denied its mystical and mythical 
meaning. It has been explained away and dismissed 
as those natural processes that allow the natural 
world, as a clockwork mechanism, to unwind. This 
perpetuates a narrow conception and understanding 
of nature. From a scientific point of view, the life-
force is irrelevant, and is obscured by our obsession 
with objects. The life-force, as a unifying principle, 
reappears only when we experience the natural 
world's wildness. 
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Wildness, here, must not be confused with 
wilderness. A wilderness is a landscape in which 
nature fully embodies and expresses itself, as "a 
complex of natural relationships where plants, ani-
mals, and the land collaborate to fulfill their environ-
ments."30 A true wilderness, if there remains such a 
thing, exists only in the absence of any human 
imprint upon the land. In the absence of true wilder-
ness, there remains only degrees of wilderness. As 
Roderick Nash, in Wilderness and the American Mind 
suggests, "the presence of an occasional beer can, 
cabin, or even road would not disqualify an area but 
only move it more slightly toward the civilized pole."31 
Wildness, on the other hand, flows through, between 
and beyond the wilderness landscape and its place-
bound beings, as an expression of life and the life-
force. 
In an experience of wilderness as a subject, the 
natural world becomes something other than a 
lifeless, meaningless and intrinsically purposeless 
resource warehouse. The wilderness's wildness 
expresses an intrinsic sense of purpose independent 
from, and essentially indifferent to human will and 
intent. Here, enveloped by wildness and wilderness, 
we become aware of the "transhuman otherness of 
the world"32 as a manifestation of the life-force and 
the wholeness of nature. 
Wildness is not, however, wholly contained 
within wilderness landscapes or in officially ordained 
natural areas. In subjective experiences of the world, 
wildness transcends all boundaries, and becomes 
manifested in the enveloping totality of the natural 
world. Even within the staunchest of urban environ-
ments, wildness manifests itself. Harvey Taylor, in his 
poem "Full Circle", shares his insights on the wildness 
of the world: 
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The ground was scraped 
barely level 
by dull bulldozer blades, 
then covered with concrete 
asphalt, and 
cement, 
as if the life-force could be 







little shoots break through, 
tiny cracks widen, 
air-borne seeds make themselves at home, 
tree roots heave slabs aside. 
The world insists on being wild. 33 
Wildness captivates the soul only when our 
objective mode of knowing and evaluating a natural 
thing, as a weed, is replaced by our subjective sense 
of it, as a living, subjective being. Taylor's experience 
renders invalid Mander's assertion that "when we live 
in cities, no experience is directly between us and the 
planet."34 In moments of heightened contact, the 
totality of nature reveals itself in all manifestations of 
wildness. 
The city exists in a natural world imbued 
with wildness and the life-force. Thus, in the city's 
forgotten, undeveloped, or purposely untended land-
scapes, wildness once again prevails. These vacant 
spaces become wild places. Though so often rendered 
insignificant or undesirable by our aesthetic tastes, 
they are in fact rich, interrelated and interdependent 
places in which plant, animal and insect communities 
dwell. Wild places, in and of themselves, are literal 
embodiments of a life-force independent from human 
will or intent. When juxtaposed against the surround-
ing city, they encapsulate the reality of an "other" 
universe of other beings' existences and experiences. 
As Fowles suggests, these wild places allow us "a 
constantly repeated awareness of the mysterious other 
universe of nature .... A love, or at least a toleration, 
of this other universe must reenter the urban ex-
perience."35 
Through our subjective experiences of urban 
wild places, we can begin to understand something 
of our own nature. In those moments of clarity and 
heightened awareness this "other" world is trans-
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formed into an extension of self. In this "person-
world mergence, ... the person feels joined and akin to 
the world."36 
IV. Wild Places And Environmental Education 
Environmental educators who seek to inspire a 
shift towards an ecological consciousness should 
recognize the importance of wild urban places as a 
context for the experience of nature and environ-
mental learning. This conclusion is drawn from two 
separate streams of thought within the field of 
environmental education and the study of nature: the 
importance of subjective experiences of the natural 
world, and the need to undertake the education 
process from within our own places. 
Environmental educators are gradually awake-
ning to the importance of the subjective experience as 
a valid means to know nature. In a recent environ-
mental education report entitled Breaking the Bar-
riers: T.inking Children With Nature, the value of 
such encounters is clearly stressed: 
To have a relationship with nature, young 
children must have meaningful personal 
experiences with natural elements and 
other species. These interactions should 
evoke a sense of wonder, magic, and 
connection with the world, as well as a 
feeling of kinship and interrelation with 
other beings. The intensity of the relation-
ship, physically, emotionally, and mentally, 
is the foundation for caring for the world 
and the basis for responsible action. 37 
The report goes on to note that such encoun-
ters with the natural world should be encouraged by 
giving children ample opportunities to experience 
natural environments. Children who live in urban 
areas need "ready access to natural settings where 
they can explore and experience other life forms."38 
Traditionally, the natural settings for such 
experiences are located outside the city, in environ-
mental education centres. Jacqui Stearn, in an article 
titled "Whatever is Environmental Education Coming 
to?" calls into question this practise of countryside 
education. She reveals a recent evolution in environ-
mental education towards "working from where 
people are," as, 
... a reaction to mere field trips to those 
separate, special places ... .It is not that 
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field trips are actually wrong, but the 
dissociation of learning that takes 
place there, from the home-frequent-
ly urban--experience, which is. 39 
In the synthesis of these two concepts, I have 
drawn the conclusion that environmental educators 
should encourage those subjective experiences within 
the context of the city. Through encounters with 
wildness in our neighborhoods and backyards we can 
begin to dispel the illusion that nature exists only out 
there, in those remote and spectacular landscapes 
seen on TV, or in conservation areas. In urban wild 
places, our lived-experiences extend into the natural 
world, and we begin to know nature as an enveloping 
totality. 
V. Case Study: The Green Campus Project 
In the present context of urban development, 
the will to preserve and restore wild places is some-
what lacking. Whereas the naturalist or environmen-
tal educator may perceive the totality of nature in a 
wild place, the planner or developer, I fear, sees only 
vacant open space and hefty economic returns. In the 
context of the Green City, our development values 
must clearly be reconsidered. 
The Green Campus Project calls into ques-
tion some of these existing values. The project, devot-
ed to the preservation of a landscape of wild places 
on the York University Campus, reflects our attempts 
to inject some "ecological sensibility"40 into current 
university planning and development practices. Along 
with the preservation proposals, we have also recom-
mended that an inner city environmental education 
and learning centre be created within this landscape. 
In the remainder of this paper, I will discuss the 
Green Campus Project in the context of these two 
proposals. 
The York Campus: Revealing a Hidden Landscape 
York University sits on a 600 acre tract of 
mostly undeveloped land in the City of North York, 
on the outskirts of Metropolitan Toronto, Canada's 
fastest growing urban area. With over 450 acres of 
"open space," the land, given its urban context, is a 
valuable economic resource. In order to unlock its 
vast economic potential, a new campus development 
masterplan was recently unveiled. If developed as 
recommended, the existing campus landscape will be 
transformed from "open space" to urban space. 
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A "landscape resource" inventory was conducted 
prior to the preparation of the masterplan. 41 This 
document and its maps supposedly identify the land's 
existing natural features so that they may be in-
corporated into the masterplan. 
The document directs our attention to four 
mature woodlots covering approximately 15 acres of 
land. These woodlots should be preserved, the docu-
ment suggests, for their aesthetic appeal, as a "gate-
way:" They will "create a natural and symbolic eastern 
entrance to the Campus." 42 Aside from the woodlots, 
the inventory reveals little else of the landscape, 
characterizing the remaining 400 or so acres of 
undeveloped land as undifferentiated space, as "un-
used open field."43 This economically biased analysis 
of the land becomes a licence to develop it, as recom-
mended by the masterplan. 44 
Unfortunately, the inventory failed to reveal 
York's "hidden landscape." As a result, the master-
pian, if implemented as proposed, will lead to the 
eradication of some 50 acres of untended pioneer 
homesteads and farmland, gone wild. Though not a 
wilderness, the hidden landscape is imbued with wild-
ness, and our sense of that wildness is accentuated 
through its juxtaposition against the urban realm. 
Where farmers once cleared and subdued the 
land, there are now meadows positively bristling with 
the energy of flowers, insects and birds. In some 
fields, young trees have rooted themselves, in the now 
untilled soil. A number of untended and overgrown 
remnants of orchards continue to bear plentiful fruit. 
Forgotten and now politically irrelevant hedgerows 
tell stories of past land divisions; though planted by 
humans, they are now very much a part of nature's 
continuum. Nestled among the trees, old house and 
barn foundations, too, have gone wild as they crumble 
under the passage of time; the spaces between their 
walls are now home to elm trees and sumac. 
Though not threatened by development, even 
the favoured woodlots are a part of the hidden 
landscape. Viewed from our cars, the woodlots, as 
gateways to the campus, remain obscure and mean-
ingless things on the aesthetic landscape. Only when 
we experience them from within do we know them 
differently, as wild, living places. Here, amidst aged 
and majestic trees and their offspring, we enter an 
"other" world of nature's rhythms, smells, sounds and 
sensations, a world of other beings' places. 
From an official, "provincial" perspective, the 
hidden landscape in an aesthetic or scientific sense, is 
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not particularly significant: there are no prominent 
geographical features, nor is the land inhabited by 
any rare or unusual plant or animal species. But 
there is wildness in which we can learn to dwell. 
The preservation of the hidden landscape and 
its inherent wildness underlies our efforts in the 
Green Campus Project. We have been working with 
the campus planners to incorporate the hidden 
landscape into the development masterplan. But the 
project is much more than an exercise in planning 
and greening; there is also a strong educational 
component in our work. As the site for a proposed 
ecological education and learning centre, the hidden 
landscape would provide an experiential basis for 
ecological literacy and the cultivation of an urban 
ecological consciousness. 
The need for such a place within the city 
became abundantly clear to me on a recent visit to 
the Mono Cliffs Outdoor Education Centre. Located in 
a conservation area some 80 kilometres outside of the 
city, this facility caters to children who attend schools 
in North York. At Mono Cliffs, the value of subjective 
experiences of nature is clearly recognized; children 
are encouraged to encounter the naturalized farmland 
setting as they will, in their own way. 
During my stay at the Centre, I was startled 
to learn that the children in attendance were from 
the Driftwood Public School, which is located on the 
western boundary of the York Campus, directly 
adjacent to the hidden landscape. While educators are 
willing to send 200 children out to the country to 
learn about nature, they are oblivious to its presence 
in their own backyard. These children, as a result, 
_receive mixed messages. Nature encount ered in 
countryside landscapes is somehow more valuable 
than that which is manifested in the city. We preach 
preservation and conservation to our children, and 
yet, in the case of the hidden landscape, we also 
propose to eradicate nature that manifests itself in 
the midst of our places. In the resulting confusion, 
the child, I fear, will fail to understand nature as an 
enveloping totality; nature, the child learns, is known 
according to its parts, and valued only in those special 
landscapes. This schism of values sustains the urban 
dilemma. 
If we are to move towards the Green City and 
an urban ecological consciousness, we must fmd ways 
to resolve this dilemma. It will begin with a willing-
ness to preserve urban wild places. While we all 
share responsibility in this undertaking, it is also 
clear that environmental educators and planners have 
Vol. 2, 1990 
to work together towards a common VISton for the 
city and our relationship to the natural world. Thro-
ugh the Green Campus Project we have hopefully 
initiated that process of co-operation. 
Notes 
1. David Abram, "The Perceptual Implications of Gaia, • '!'he 
Ecologist, 15:3 (1985), p. 98. 
2. For a British perspective on the Green City Movement, 
see: David Nicholson-Lord , The C:reoning of the Cities 
(London• Routledge and Kogan Paul, 1967}; for a Canadian 
perspective, see City Magazine, 11:1 (1989), which is 
devoted entirely to the Canadian Green City Movement. 
3. Jim Savago, "Groening the City", Probe Post, 9: l 
(1987), p. 22. 
4. Open space, in the context of this discussion, in-
cludes: parkland, playgrounds, school yards, open areas 
around buildings, and undeveloped land. 
5. See, for example: A.D. Bradshaw, and J.F. Handley, "An 
Ecological Approach to Landscape Design," Landscape 
Design, 138 May (1982), pp 30-34; O.D. Manning, "New 
Directions 3: Designing for Man and Nature", Landscape 
Design, 140:November (1982), pp. 30-32. Other authors 
incorporate social processes with natural processes in 
their discussions on the ecological aesthetic. see, tor 
example, Anne Whinston Spirn, "The Poetics of City and 
Nature:Towards an Aesthetic for Urban Design•, and Jusuck 
Koh, "An Ecological Aesthetic", in Landscape Journal, 7:2 
( 1988). 
6. Werner Nohl, "Open Space in Cities: Inventing a New 
Esthetic,• Landscape, 28:2 (1985), pp. 39-40. 
7. Savage, p. 25. 
8. Neil Evernden, The Batural Alien, (Toronto: university 
of Toronto Press, 1985), p. 19. 
9. J. Stan Rowe, "What on Earth is Environment?", The 
Trumpeter, 6:4 (1989), p. 123. 
10. John A. Livingston, The Fallacy of Wildlife Conserva-
tion, (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1981), pp. 84-
85. 
11. The cultivation of an ecological consciousness is one 
of the fundamental principles underlying a deep ecological 
and critical environmental perspective on our environmen-
tal problems. The ideas have been, and continue to be 
explored in a number of publications, including: Bill 
Devall and George Sessions, Deep Ecology: Living aa if 
Batura Mattered, (Salt Lake City: Peregrine Smith Books, 
19B5), and Tba Trulllpater, a journal "dedicated to the 
exploration of and contributions to a new ecological 
consciousness.• 
12. Devall and Sessions, Deep Ecology, p. B. 
13. Vern Weber, "The Secularization of Consciousness and 
the Artificial Environment" 1 The Trumpeter, 5:4 ( 19B8), p. 
153. 
14. Bill Devall, as quoted in Evernden, The Batura1 Alien, 
P• 29. 
15. Joseph Grange, "On the way toward Foundational 
Ecology•, Sonndinga, 60:1 (1977), p. 148. 
16. Jerry Mander, Pour ~ta for the Rliwination of 
Television, (New York: William Morrow and Company, Inc., 
197B), pp. 55-56. 
17. Rowe, in "What on Earth is Environment?", identifies 
the confusion surrounding the word •environment•, and 
suggests that we must coma to concieve environment as 
•something real and substantial, as the enveloping four-
dimensional Ecosphere.• p. 126. 
18. Stewart G. Hilts, et al., ra1ands of Green: Batura1 
Heritage Protection :in Ontario, (Toronto: Ontario Heritage 
Undercurrents 17 
Foundation, 1986), p. 15. 
19. This is a variation on John Ruskin's suggestion that 
"You do not soe with the lens of the eye; you see through 
and by means of that, but you see with the soul of the 
eye", as quoted by Edward Relph in "To See with the Soul 
of the Eye", Landscape, 23:1 (1979), p. 28. 
20. Neil Evernden, "The Ambiguous Landscape", The Geograp-
hical Review, 71:2 (l9B1), p. 149. 
21. John Fowles, "Seeing Nature Whole", Barpera, 259:1554 
(1979), p. 54. 
22. Evernden, "The Ambiguous Landscape", p. 149. 
23. Allen Carlson, "Appreciation and the Natural Environ-
ment" 1 The Journal of Aostbetica and Art Criticia., 37:3 (1979) 
24. Crango, "On the Way toward Foundational Ecology", p. 
144. 
25. Ibid. 
26. Mander, Pour Arguments for the BlL.inatlon Of Tele-
vision, p. 54. 
27. David Seamon, A Geograpby of the Lifeworld: Movement, 
Rest, and Encounter, (New York: St. Hartin's Press, 1979), 
p. 124. 
2B. Ibid., p. 111. 
29. Edward Relph, "To Sea with the Soul of the Eye", p. 
2B. 
30. Joseph Meeker, "Wisdom and Wilderness", LaDdacape, 
25:1 (1981), p. 16. 
31. Roderick Nash, Wilderness and the A..erican Mind, (New 
Haven, Con., Yale University Press, 1967) p. 7. 
32. Meeker, "Wisdom and Wilderness", p. 16. 
33. Harvey Taylor, "Full Circle", The 'l'rlnq)eter, 6:1 
(1989), p. 35. 
34. Mander, Pour Arguments for the Blimnation of Tele-
vision, p. 55. 
35. John Powles, "Weeds, Bugs, and Americans", Sports 
Illnatrated, December, 1970, p. 102. 
36. Seamon, A Geography of the Lifeworld, p. 124. 
37. The Roger Tory Paterson Institute of Natural History, 
Breaking the Barriw:u: Linking Children and Batura, (New 
York, RTPI, 1989), p. 5. 
lB. Ibid ., p. 6. 
39. Jacqui Stearn, "Whatever is Environmental Education 
coming to?", UrbaD Wildlife, 2:1 (l9BB), p. 21. 
40. The phrase •ecological sensibility• is used by John 
Rodman in his article "Four Forms of Ecological conscious-
ness Reconsidered" in Ethics and the Envi.ron.mt eds. 
Donald Scharer and Thomas Attig, (Englewood Cliffs: 
Prentice-Hall Inc. , 19B5). In the context of our work, we 
have used the term in expressing to university adminis-
trators the neod to incorporate ecological knowledge and 
sensitivity in land development practices. 
41. York Ca.pus Master Plan: Landscape Resources, p. J, 
fig. 3 . 
42. Ibid., p. 12. 
43. It-id., p. e. 
44. York Ca.pna Master Plan: Structnre Plan, p. 3, pp. 19-
20. 
Vol. 2, 1990 
MANIFESTATION 
Where there is an open door 
I will walk through it, 
to find that place uncontained, 
that space undefined 
Poetry 
by walls or floors or ceilings - the only border 
made by the limits of my own skull. 
My feet - unshod 
by pavement - will know where to tread: 
on fallen twigs and needles, 
avoiding mouse and flower and spider web, 
even if eyes are closed 
to allow smell and hearing to savor, 
to guide most wisely and willingly 
as if following a map 
woven into the genetic code. 
And there you will flnd gods: 
hearts pulsing with every 
murmur and thump and flutter, 
blood coursing red and green through miles of vessels, 
breath coming the howling, moaning wind 
and the sighs of pine boughs. 
Then I will let all this wrap around me, 
wrap me into it, 
and open myself around it, my hands 
ever caressing tenderly wliat invisible 
corporeal form I give it, knowing 
its inimite topography 
as well as a lover's. 
And, when at last I need to rest, 
I shall lie 
with my ear to the ground. 
L.F. 
• 
by Louise Fabicmi and Isabella Colalillo Katz • 
TO DANTE FROM 1981 
We are oft 
without centre 
computerized 
in the medulla oblongata of living 
suffering poets of life ... 
What are the stars 
but light? 
Oneiric waves of eternal flowing; 
to our eyes 










Louise Fabiani is in the Faculty of Environmental Studies at York University, where she concentrates on environmental 
thought, particularly cultural attitudes toward nature. Drawing and poetry since childhood, she now investigates the role 
of symbols and ~h in 'nature art•. 
Isabella Colalillo Katz is a graduate student at the Ontario Institute for Studies in Education. 
Undercurrents 18 Vol. 2, 1990 
ENLIGHTENMENT 
ONE AFrERNOON IN THE ORINOCCO BASIN 
No eye can penetrate 
the green dark but the mind 
ventures, a road forms; 
the road welcomes machines, f:tre, 
and, within hours, there is enough clearing 
for a million human eyes 
to see 
nothing. 
The vertical systems - an eon of adaptation -
are brought to earth, destroying 
the "cancer cures," the "new crops," the "contra-
ceptives;" through the sudden , yellow light they tumble 
into a more permanent darkness. We mourn 
but our loss: the collector's regret at the trophy unknown, 
the mystery unsolved. The phenomenon of life 
is the ultimate abstraction. 
Through complexity, these lives co-evolved. 
Through stupidity, they cease existence, 
rotting quickly under the blind eye of the sun, 
glare unfiltered by the emerald canopy, 
the anchored clouds. To dust 
they return - fertilizer 
for grazing meat. 
In the held-breath silence of destruction's wake, 
a voice emerges: a creature sings its own elegy: 
My nose searches the air 
for the scent image of my mate, 
but she is covered in smoke. My cries 
Profusely 
confused 
I reach to the afternoon 
wind. 
echo across the hollow forest. She is long gone -
a shard of shattered jewel, 
music 
Time clenched 
between my teeth, 
rises 
to syllabus of tears. 
Cleaning day arrives. 
Laughter melts 







a thread from the tattered tapestry. 
My seeds will die - lonely - within me. 
Our children are sawdust. 
Our entire species 
is me. 
L.F. 
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The Intertwining Wildness Of Flesh-Child Becoming 
Let us explore two central facts of the child's 
experience: first, that it has a body and second, that 
it exists on the earth. Let us do so with the help of 
a third term, called the flesh, which can mediate 
between these two experiences. Let us further 
explore the nature of the interaction between earth, 
body and flesh by way of the concept of intertwining 
calling attention to a constant interpresencing of 
elements, and also by way of the concept of wildness 
calling attention to an absence of artificially imposed 
boundaries. 
The Problem of Development 
The child becomes in an anti-development 
because its becoming is of the flesh. 1 Development 
is a stagist drama worked out within the illusions of 
civilized unremembering, a severe trope of forgetful-
ness hom out of the fear of death and absence, a fear 
of mortality. In begirming a journey of flesh en-
velopment, the child has no need for the phallocentric 
sky-gods of society, that vast simulation of reproduc-
tions of reproductions which synchronically slides 
from reifled signifier to reifled signifier only to fold 
back on itself in an eternal recurrence of the same, a 
movement that generates the domination of Symbolic 
Law. 2 No denigration of its fleshly existence compels 
the child to seek completion within the prison-house 
of civilized pedagogy. Anti-pedagogy pervades the 
child's being, for pedagogy is a poison of anti-flesh in 
its rise above the flesh into the ordered heaven of the 
Symbolic Law, the always ever structuring. 
The child laughs in remembrance of the phal-
locentric rise of the Symbolic Law wrapped in the 
loins of the ever so boring monologue and footy of 
forgetfulness. With an imageless hearty bellow, the 
child chases away the bad dream of fixed space-time 
co-ordinates, the up-down, rise-fall, vertical-hori-
zontal quag-mire of disciplined ego adaptation. These 
co-ordinates are not stabilizing concepts, productive of 
knowing, but fetishized horrors of order, a reifled 
• 
by Paul Nonnekes • 
hardening of perception into the staticized man-
nequins of culture. 
The child dreams its own dreams and not the 
father's (the fearful, punitive super-ego) within the 
wildness of becoming, not wildness as chaos, but a 
wildness generating stability through diversity, 
complexity and the absence of fixed, completing 
limits, in this way circumventing the dictates of 
power/order. It is fully body-flesh, body-earth, 
flesh-earth, earth-body-flesh, as a movement, not in 
linear time and homogenous space, but within the 
interstices of the wild itself, an ecstatic dance of 
forms that lies both within and beyond language. 
These forms are not organs. The wild 
flesh-child is anti-organ. Organs are an illusory trope 
of medicalized practice designed to inflict a disciplined 
pain on the wild flesh of the child. Opposed to all 
organicity, the ecstatic forms of the flesh-body of the 
child reach out as innumerous invisible threads to 
the flesh of the world, as auras of sensibility, in-
gathering and outgathering in a pulsion of growth 
that is neither an inside nor an outside, but an 
intertwining.3 The intertwining flesh is the to and 
fro space of transition, the creative realm of paradox. 
Thought of as stability and completion by its 
own praisers, civilization instead constitutes a burden 
of image-structure on the wild flesh-child. With a 
pompous pretence, civilization seeks to impose a 
divisory schema on the flesh, a severe either/or: 
either you submit to order in the form of civilized 
pedagogy or you will be left in a destructive, un-
productive chaos of perverse, instinctual passions. 
Here, the Hobbesian formulation of the problem of 
order4 has made thinkable state-making as a con-
struction of acceptable boundaries, boundaries not just 
geographical, but boundaries of the flesh itself, where 
the subject as citizen becomes the effect of a fateful 
ordering, a law and 6rder-bound processional consti-
tutive of what our omnipresent social therapists like 
to call ego-strength. 
Paul Nonnekes is a PhD Canditate in the Sociology Department at York University. Be is presently nearing 
completion o! a dissertation on children's play. His interests include the many dimensions or the child's experience ot 
body and earth especially as they concern the socially and politically charged issues at tamily, gender and sexuality. 
Undercurrents 20 Vol. 2, 1990 
The wild flesh-child, as a being with no ab-
stractly simulated bonndaries, is rendered a pathol-
ogy by this power/order processional of state-making. 
We observe an ascension or a falling upward into a 
heaven-bonnd hegemonic space. This in turn genera-
tes a fear of the ever-free, ever-creative rising descent 
of spirit into the gay and festive carnival of dancing, 
devilish flesh. Within this movement, our liberal 
state-makers wear the fateful masks of pedagogues 
and therapists, moralizing over the anti-social destruc-
tiveness of the flesh. 
The Figuration of Meaning 
The new-born flesh-child is a fully graced being. 
As we approach this child what is required of us is a 
respect not wilik.e a divine reverence, for we en-
counter here in a most fundamental and primordial 
way the mystery of Being, a mystery which does not 
call out from us the mastery of explanation but a 
measure of dignity in our nnderstanding. With its 
fll'st breath, a profane journey has begnn for the 
flesh-child, a journey in which an individualized 
human world arises in growth from within the 
intertwining, interpresencing of the flesh as home, 
gronnd, earth, a distinctively concentrated creative 
moment of the flesh in its quest for expression in the 
wild and free variety of individuality. 
The child is the flesh; the flesh is the child. 
The child loves the flesh; the flesh loves the child. 
The child abides in the flesh as a thankful being. Its 
project of becoming is a holy project. As Rudolf 
Steiner reminds us: "The child is given up to its 
environment and lives in the external world in 
reverence and prayerful devotion. . .. the blood 
circulation, breathing and nourishment process are 
praying to the environment." 5 
In being of the flesh, the child participates in an 
original figuration of phenomenon. As Owen Barfield 
informs us, there is "an awareness of an extra-sensory 
link between the percipient and the representa-
tions."6 Barfield goes on to say that with respect to 
this ongoing figuration, "there stands behind the 
phenomenon and on the other side of them from me 
a represented which is of the same nature as me."7 
This means that the flesh-child in the very act of 
being brings into play the being of the world, fi-
gurates it in an originary sense, as its sensibilities are 
extended out as innumerable invisible threads to the 
world surrounding it and joins them, couples them, 
in a common destiny. 
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The Body/Earth as Idol 
Thinking about the child is skewed when, as 
in Western discourse, this being is posited as having 
to develop an ego, an alien, disciplinary, structuring 
symbolic that must come to inhabit a chaotic realm 
of body as object, earth as object. 
The body as object is an idol, and this kind 
of thinking is idolatry. It leads to the felt experience, 
so common in the West, of a non-participated world, 
a blinding habitus of forgetfulness of our original 
participation in and figuration of the world. As 
civilized adults armed with this unremembering 
idolatry, we turn to the child's experience as if the 
child too were surrounded by a world of unparticipat-
ed idols, a world of objects not of the same nature a8 
that which we feel is substantially us: humanity 
conceived as an ordered, structured symbolic. In this 
civilized processional, grace comes only through an 
ascended structure; the fleshly body of the child is 
always outside of grace, perverse and ugly, and in 
need of ego-control. 
It would be a mistake, though, to think of 
this ego-control--standing over against a world of 
idols--as constitutive of individuality. The formation 
of the ego in the Western oeuvre is not individuation, 
but is instead a power construct isolated by a social 
code which has granted itself the privilege of naming 
that which is "freedom" and that which is "autonomy." 
The child can come to graduate into the structuring, 
command-work of signifiers only through an early 
submission to the ordering and disciplining powers of 
pedagogy and therapy, the "free" and "autonomous" 
ego constituting the end-point of a stagist drama of 
development prescribed and continually governed by 
teachers, doctors, social workers and therapists. 
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The civilized social code of power seeks to 
institute a fall upwards in the flesh-child, a tumbling 
ascent out of the interpresencing of the flesh. Its goal 
is to push the flesh-child into a spirit of forgetfulness 
of its originary intertwinement within the flesh as 
true home, a home surrounded by the gay and festive 
laughter of interpenetration. The flesh as home is 
the ceaseless and perpetual between which we can 
know. The fixed and ordered social code of power is 
an illusion, a dreadful nightmare which we need to 
awaken from through a concentration of imagination. 
The Profane Flesh 
The child's becoming is a profane experience, 
yet one that is at the same time fully graced. For 
the child to unbecome in the pain of pedagogy is 
sacred. This mix-up of sacred and profane allows us 
to account for the potential of the flesh-child to move 
from original participation in either an individuating 
rising descent within the flesh itself or a falling 
ascent into civilized unremembering. For Western 
pedagogy, the founding myth for the child's growth is 
that of a fall upwards into a differentiated psyche or 
non-participating consciousness. It is a myth that 
seeks to structure the child's experience into a 
divisory either/or: either we stake our humanity on 
the heavenly ascent of order or else, so the story 
goes, there will be nothing but the chaos of animal, 
earth and flesh, a dis-order unfit for human habita-
tion. 
The profane mythopoeic of Western discourse 
begins with the Greeks in Plato's Ideal realm and 
Aristotle's form/matter distinction and continues in 
orthodox, exoteric, Christian practice (although there 
is a more liberating esoteric Christian counter-tradi-
tion that subverts this development). This mythopoeic 
represents a massive simulation of order and fixity. 
By removing itself from interpresenced participation 
in the flesh, civilized pedagogy can only speak of the 
life of the child from the far-away heavenly Hades of 
its self-fetishized prison-house of order. Speaking in 
a monotone voice of monologue, it can only see the 
being of the child according to a fearful tmmel-vision. 
There is a fear of the becoming of life in the child 
engendered by a carnivalesque recital of growth which 
is a continuous creative force of death and rebirth. 
The Open of the Earth 
The flesh-child's becoming, as a holy and sacred 
practice is the craftful building up of a temple from 
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within the earth.8 This creative work is not a 
phallocentric, heaven-bound rise above the earth, its 
ground, but a formation from within an Open in the 
earthly being of the child itself, a constant descent in 
earthly reverberation rather than ascent to heavenly 
heights. 9 But at the same time, this descent is not a 
devouring or swallowing up, but always a rising 
descent, for the temple as a world of meaning is 
lighted from within the sheltering darkness. Light-
ness of opening and darkness of sheltering are 
inseparable as two oscillating moments in a dialogical 
process of becoming that constitutes the child's world. 
Respect must be given to the sheltering 
moment in the growth of the child as temple, for the 
earthly being of the child will rebel against any 
attempt to hold mastery over it through a phallo-
centric penetration. As Heidegger tells us: "Earth 
thus shatters every attempt to penetrate into it. It 
causes every merely calculating importunity upon it 
to turn into destruction.n1° For the wild growth of 
the child as temple is a dignified process which 
spurns any claims to a fast-paced time-table of ascent. 
The templechild's earthly ground is most fundamen-
tally a "self-secluding."11 It allows the beauty of the 
templework to come to be in the most striking and 
breathtaking way when thankful homage is paid to its 
sure and sound pace. Everything in due time for the 
growth of the child as temple, time not as an ordered, 
linear clock-work of agendic stages that pyramidically 
funnel to the top, the ego, but a weaving of a gar-
ment in which the complex ingathering of a multi-
tude of strands come together to dance in a carnival 
of beauty that is a craft-enacted meaning for the 
child. 
The Speech of Earth-Body-Flesh 
It is at this point that we realize that it is in 
the very ingathering movement of the child's creativ-
ity that the fleshly texture of the world, which is the 
always ever in-between of body and earth, comes to 
gain expression. There is no mind-ego that needs to 
develop in the child that must then imagistically come 
to terms with a reality "outside" of it. The child is of 
the flesh. The ingathering individualizing movement 
of language enacted by the child happens from within 
the interstices of the flesh as an originary inter-
presenced intertwining wholeness. Barfield's com-
ments are significant: "Speech did not arise as the 
attempt of man to imitate, to master or explain 
'nature'; for speech and nature come into being along 
with one another.n12 The roots of language in the 
child do not descend from a stable social symbolic, 
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but arise from the flesh of the world striving for 
expression in the child. As Barfield says, "Roots are 
the echo of nature herself sounding in man."13 
There is a unity of sound and meaning at the 
level of the child's initiatory speech which is an 
originary figuring that brings into being the play of 
the world. This has been forgotten by a civilized 
pedagogy bent on severing language from a fleshly 
figuring and reifying it into a set of abstract signifiers 
typographically mechanized int o mannicanized charac-
ters bound within the ordered processional of book 
technology. Here, the child is burdened with a 
capital-ism ofletters, a foot-note, end-note, chapter by 
chapter indexing of expression into a controlling and 
therefore controllable science-text of power. 
The speech of the child is a fully earth-ground-
ed phenomenon that arises from within the texture 
of the flesh itself. Embedded within the texture of 
the flesh of the world as a participatory being, the 
child begins to articulate a sound-symbolism through 
which the flesh itself gains its expression. In its 
burgeoning speech the child is participating in the 
awe-inspiring mystery of the original figurating power 
of language as Word. We can discover, says Barfield, 
"in the consonantal element in language vestiges of 
those forces which brought into being the external 
structure of nature, including the body of man; and 
in the original vowel-sounds, the expression of that 
inner life of feeling and memory whlch constitutes his 
soul."14 It is a grave mistake, then, to portray the 
child's speech as a Symbolic structuring needed to 
give order to a world without order. The child's 
speech is a participation in and reenactment of an 
ori.ginary Word that emanates from the very lining of 
the flesh and begins to craft a meaningful world for 
itself. 
The sounds that are uttered by the child are 
sounds that have life and colour and tone. They have 
shape. 'We feel these shapes," says Barfield, "not only 
as sounds, but also, in a manner, as gestures of the 
speech organs--and it is not difficult to realize that 
these gestures were once gestures made with the 
whole body--once--when the body itself was not 
detached from the rest of nature after the solid 
matter of today, when the body itself was spoken 
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even while it was speaking.n15 
The task of the child in crafting an indivi-
dualized style of being for itself is a task of the 
imagination. It involves a concentration of imagina-
tion where the potential meaning lying dormant in 
the flesh is ingathered through sound-symbolism--li-
ving metaphor--to form a unique and particular style 
of being that genuinely can be called a Self. This Self 
crafted by the child is not a substance, as Western 
metaphysics from the Greeks onward would have it. 
It is not an ego "adapted" to a world ever always 
structured in the prison-house of society. The Self of 
the child is anti-substance, an anti-order of Open-ing 
descent, for this Self comes to be only as engendered 
from within the Eternal Play of Being, always flowing 
through the cycles of death and rebirth, always 
becoming in a creative dance of new forms. 
The Elemental Language of the Flesh 
The woven garment of the flesh that is the 
world for the child has its stability in variety and 
complexity. The flesh abhors and rebels against the 
unitary monoculture that civilized unremembering 
seeks to impose upon it. It laughs in gargantuan 
derision at this foolhardy attempt by the sky-gods of 
culture to wash over the multitudinous profusion of 
forms of the flesh with the smooth and fiXed trajec-
tories of assembly-line productivity. The flesh knows 
the inherent unstability of life based on the fear of 
diversity, on the unitary tic-tic-tic pumping-out of 
sameness. 
The world of sameness is not the world the 
flesh-child loves. It provides no stability for the child 
to grow in, but an artificially simulated and fear 
induced weakness of fiXed and static monocultural 
structure. The flesh-child loves the world of freedom 
and creativity, the wo.rld of ecosystem diversity, from 
whlch comes the Real stability and continuity of life 
as lived. This is the world of the flesh, the intertwin-
ing wildness of becoming. 
It is in this spirit that the French phenome-
nologist Maurice Merleau-Ponty brings us his reflec-
tions on the significance of the flesh for human 
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becoming. Merleau-Ponty's central insight is that 
human being in-the-world is caught up inextricably 
with the life of the flesh, that every individual being 
"is of it."16 What lines all our beings, he says, is ~a 
continuous tissue of exterior and interior horizons." 17 
As we observe the new-born child's initial movements 
in and through the fleshly texture of the world, we 
begin to realize that "there must exist some relation-
ship by principle, some kinship." There is an "initia-
tion to and opening upon a tactile world."18 
This kinship is established by the very mode of 
interaction the child has with the world, an interac-
tion which reveals an inherent reversibility in its 
being. What is this reversibility? As Merleau-Ponty 
tells it: "Since the same body sees and touches, 
visible and tangible belong to the same world."19 
There is, in his eyes, "a thickness of flesh between 
the seer and the thing."20 This thickness of flesh "is 
not an obstacle between them, it is their means of 
communication." 21 
The "thickness of the body" of the child does 
not stand over against the world, in competition with 
it, such that it must establish its rights by control 
and domination, but is, in fact, says Merleau-Ponty, 
"the sole means I have to go unto the heart of things, 
by making myself a world and by making them 
flesh."22 The child's body, then, is quite literally 
"caught up in the tissue of things." 23 
This means that it is impossible for a truly 
meaningful world to be formed by the child as the 
project of a developing consciousness that in its 
interaction with the flesh of the world "surveys it 
from above." The child needs to "co-exist with them 
in the same world."2~ Conscious individuality only 
arises for the child from within the kinship of Being 
such that its budding vision forms from "the surface 
of a depth, a cross-section upon a massive being, a 
grain or corpuscle borne by a wave of Being. "25 
Human knowing, as a burgeoning relationship 
of wonder that constitutes the Self of the child in its 
meaningfulness comes to be from within the body/-
flesh, knower/known kinship as a mode of concentra-
tion such that the child's body "concentrates the 
mystery of its scattered visibility." 26 As a knowing 
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that comes to be through a kinship, we may just as 
well say, with Merleau-Ponty, that it is "the world 
that thinks itself" through the growing child. We 
come to the realization "that each calls for the 
other."27 
There is no distancing or divisory separation 
for the knowing child, but a concentration of the 
mystery, for we see that the visibles of the fleshly 
world, 
are about it, they even enter into its 
enclosure, they are within it, they line 
its looks and its hands inside and 
outside. If it touches them and sees 
them, this is only because, being of 
their family, itself visible and tangible, 
it uses its own being as a means to 
participate in theirs, because each of 
the two beings is an archetype for the 
other, because the body belongs to the 
order of things as the world is univer-
sal flesh. 28 
The child participates in this universal flesh 
because its body is of it. We need to reverse our 
common understanding of the relationship between 
inside and outside for the child. The child's body 
does not come to enter and penetrate the world from 
an outside and independent point and the world does 
not then come to impinge upon the child's body and 
demand of it some accommodation. It is important 
for us to avoid the phallocentric language of penetra-
tion. Rather, it is better for us to speak, as Mer-
leau-Ponty does, of an "intertwining of one in the 
other." 
The child begins to grow in meaningful know-
ledge and wisdom when it realizes itself as a tangible, 
a visible, and precisely because of this, it is able to, 
says Merleau-Ponty, "turn back upon the whole of the 
visible, the whole of the tangible, of which it is a 
part" such that there occurs a Visibility which be-
longs "neither to the body qua fact nor the world qua 
fact," for it turns out that "each is only a rejoinder of 
the other, and which therefore form a couple, a 
couple more real than either of them. "29 
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Due to the indissoluble kinship between knower 
and known, child and world, the known reverberates 
back to become knower, knows itself in and through 
the child's knowing and the child as knower inter-
twines itself within that which it is knowing becom-
ing always ever a known, inextricably part of the 
fleshly stuff of life. Merleau-Ponty tells us that "since 
the seer is caught up in what he sees, it is still 
himself he sees; there is a fundamental narcissism of 
vision." 30 
The child is of the earthly world and the earth-
ly world is of the child, forming a vast connective 
tissue of bonding threads and rays called the flesh. 
This flesh is not a substance, a 1.8 Western metaphys-
ics, but an "element" as it used to be spoken in 
pre-Socratic language of earth, air, water and fire. 
These four elements of the world correspond in a vast 
series of resemblances to the four elemental humours 
of the child's bodily being: sanguine, choleric, melan-
choly and phlegmatic. This has no relation to what 
in modern psychology has become the "personality. • 
The static personality of modern psychology is a 
clinical label arising out of a therapeutic intent. The 
four elemental humours are instead a constantly 
intertwining process where the child, with a parti-
cular crafted style of being, is not 
only alive but open, extending out 
and back, outgathering and ingather-
ing, never fiXing itself at any parti-
cular point, but gayly sliding from 
one threaded relationship to another. 
No development of "cognition" 
occurs in the flesh-child, no develop-
ment of a purely "mental" life that 
seeks to form abstract "ideas" about a 
world independent from and outside 
of the ongoing cycles of life. What 
grows in the child is the ability to 
gather in a unique style, a unique 
individuality from within its thankful 
participation in the kinship of Being. 
This is a feat which comes through a 
concentration of the imagination, a 
"central vision" says Merleau-Ponty, 
"that joins the scattered visions, a 
unique touch."3 1 There is: 
a bursting forth of the 
mass of the body toward 
the things. . . .a vibration 
of my skin. . . .a magical 
relation, this pact between 
them and me according to 
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which I lend my body in order that 
they inscribe upon it and give me 
their resemblance. . . .a constant style 
of visibility from which I cannot de-
tach myself. 32 
This is a long way from the divisory either/or, or-
der/chaos of civilized pedagogy. "The flesh," Mer-
leau-Ponty tells us, "is not contingency, chaos, but a 
texture that returns to itself and conforms to itself."33 
We may say that as a child comes to form an 
individualized world for itself from within the kinship 
and texture of the flesh, as it comes to form a unique 
crafted style of being, there occurs an Open-ing up of 
a dimension that can never again be closed. This 
dimension, says Merleau-Ponty, is the "invisible of 
this world, sustains it, and renders it visible, its own 
and interior possibility the Being of this being. "34 
The child then truly grows and becomes through an 
intensified participation with its whole crafted style in 
a "natural light that illuminates all flesh. •35 
The child's style of being is an inner light 
imagination, an imatio Christi, that brings into play 
the Word become flesh, 36 "an operative Word," says 
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Merleau-Ponty, "whence comes the instituted light."37 
In the kinship between between inner light and 
natural light, through an imatio Christi within fulfil-
ling the Word that was always ever there from the 
beginning, there is, Merleau-Ponty tells us, "a rever-
sibility of the speech and what it signifies, the signi-
fication is what comes to seal, to close, to gather up 
the multiplicity of the physical, physiological, lin-
guistic means of elocution, to construct them into one 
sole act."38 
As the child descends within the dark inter-
twining of the flesh to reside in the light of language-
· which does not overcome the darkness but co-exists 
with it--it participates in an originary power of sig-
nification, an originary power of naming. In this 
embodied activity of the child is restored and kept 
alive the primordial rememberance of "a wild mean-
ing. . .. language is everything since it is the voice of 
no one, since it is the very voice of the things, the 
waves and the forest."39 
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Three Visions Of An Ecological Self 
Envisioning the possibility of an ecologically 
appropriate society involves being able to imagine, not 
just a different way of living, but also a different way 
of being. Deep ecology, social ecology and ecofemin-
ism are approaches which both critique the current 
dominant society and attempt to envision how this 
society might look and behave, given a more eco-
logically appropriate self-understanding. 1 
"Self," as we understand it today, is a relatively 
recent concept hom with the emergence of humanism 
in seventeenth century Europe. Before this time, 
identity was rooted in community and place, and 
meaning was found in God rather than in individual 
humans. Today we take for granted notions of 
individual identity and individual rights. Such 
concepts would have been meaningless before the 
seventeenth century. Yet today they underlie West-
ern culture's most basic values and principles. 2 
In developing their visions of an ecological 
society, deep ecology, social ecology, and ecofeminism 
all look to our understanding of self as the critical 
element determining how we live and relate to the 
world around us. All three recognize the dominant 
society's de!tnition of self as narrow and limiting. Yet 
their proposals for a new deftnition of self involve 
very different assumptions about what it means to be 
human and what it means to be in relationship with 
other species. 
While the dominant worldview regards humans 
as fundamentally different and separate from nature, 
deep ecologists regard humans to be continuous with 
the rest of nature and not as superior or more 
important. Deep ecologist Bill Devall distinguishes 
between the "minimalist self' whose goal is merely 
immediate survival, and the "ecological self' whose 
goal is personal growth through empathy and solidar-
ity with other beings. 3 
For deep ecologists individual maturation and 
self-realization requires that we not only grow to 
identify ourselves with other humans, but with the 
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nonhuman world as well: 
Traditionally the maturity of self has 
been considered to develop through 
three stages, from ego to social self, 
comprising the ego, and from there to 
metaphysical self, comprising the 
social self. But Nature is then largely 
left out in the conception of this proc-
ess.4 
In an attempt to redress the OIDlSSlOn of 
nature from traditional theories of self development, 
Arne Naess (who originated the term "deep ecology") 
proposes the concept of "ecological self." An ecological 
self is expanded beyond the narrow sense of individ-
ual ego, because of an identification with others, 
human and nonhuman. Thus, with growing maturity 
and growing identification, the self is widened and 
deepened.5 Deep ecologists have also explained this 
growing maturity as "self-realization," involving a 
realization of both the individual self and the larger 
Self of which everything is a part. 
Australian deep ecologist Warwick Fox sug-
gests "there is no bifurcation in reality between the 
human and the non-human realms. "6 To suggest 
that there are no divisions and no boundaries bet-
ween entities is not to suggest that there are no 
individuals and no differences. The deep ecology 
"norms" of self-realization and biocentric equality 
require that: 
all things in the biosphere have an 
equal right to live and blossom and to 
reach their own individual forms of 
unfolding and self-realization within 
the larger Self-realization. 7 
This understanding that we are unique in-
dividuals yet connected to a larger whole, is arrived 
at mainly through an intuitive or spiritual feeling 
which many deep ecologists have experienced at some 
time. Naess recognizes that if one has not had such 
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an experience of connection or extended identification, 
"one is not easily drawn to become involved in deep 
ecology."8 For this reason, it is perhaps the deep 
ecology notion of "extended identity" and of no boun-
daries between humans and nonhuman nature that 
is most unsettling for, and most often misinterpreted 
by, critics of deep ecology. Some feminists, for ex-
ample, feel that the deep ecology notion of extended 
identity and "no boundaries" ignores women's struggle 
for autonomy and individuation. 9 They warn that 
any call to extend identity which does not incorporate 
a critique of patriarchal culture's association of 
human identity with the masculine will further 
negate and subjugate the female self to the male self. 
This criticism, however, overlooks deep ecology 
notions of self-realization and diversity, which may 
potentially have liberating implications for women. 
As N aess explains: 
Self-realization is the realization of the 
potentialities of life. Organisms that differ 
from each other in three ways give us less 
diversity than organisms that differ from 
each other in one hundred ways. There-
fore, the self-realization we experience 
when we identify with the universe is 
heightened by an increase in the number 
of ways in which individuals, societies, 
and even species and life forms realize 
themselves. The greater the diversity, 
then, the greater the self-realization. 10 
Identification "with the universe• does not 
entail the erasure of individual identity and auton-
omy. For deep ecology, individuality and connection 
are not mutually exclusive dualisms. Overcoming the 
culturally imposed dichotomies between self and 
other, individual and whole, receptivity and activity, 
etc. entails a balance, or relationship, between the 
two "sides" rather than a negation of one by the 
other. 
In contrast to accusations that deep ecology is 
attempting to wipe out the self, Devall and Sessions 
claim that deep ecology asks: 
What does it mean to be a unique human 
individual? How can the individual self 
maintain and increase its uniqueness 
while also being an inseparable aspect of 
the whole system wherein there are no 
sharp breaks between self and the 
other?11 
Devall explains that "exploring ecological self is 
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part of the transforming process required to heal 
ourselves in the world.ftl 2 This process of healing and 
developing a "transpersonal self' begins with self-
awareness. Devall proposes that growth to a trans-
personal self frees us from the need for constraining 
ethics: 
As we discover our ecological self we 
will joyfully defend and interact with 
that with which we identify; and 
instead of imposing environmental 
ethics on people, we will naturally 
respect, love, honor and protect that 
which is our self ... No moral exhor-
tation or dogmatic statement of envi-
ronmental ethics is necessary to show 
care for other beings--including rivers 
or mountains--if our self in this broad 
and deep sense embraces the other 
beingY 
For deep ecologists it is from the expanded 
identification of self with the rest of nature (human 
and nonhuman) that transformation to an ecological 
society will flow. 
Social ecology also recognizes the importance 
of the development of the self in the achieving of an 
ecological society: 
We often speak of self-management 
and self-activity as our ideals for a 
future society without recognizing 
often enough that it is not only the 
"management" and "activity" that has 
to be democratized; it is also the "se1f' 
of each individual--as a unique, crea-
tive, and competent being--that has 
to be fully developed.14 
Social ecologist Murray Bookchin criticizes the 
Western mode of perception which "traditionally 
defmes selfhood in antagonistic terms."15 This defini-
tion perceives the self as an ego which is not only 
distinguished from the external "other," but also 
"seeks to master these others and to bring them into 
subjugation." Bookchin suggests that self develop-
ment entails a recognition of the self as distinct from 
the "other" (rather than as continuous with, or ex-
tended to include the other, as deep ecology sug-
gests). However, this distinction need not require an 
antagonistic or domineering relationship to the other. 
Whereas hierarchical society tends to rank differences 
hierarchically, social ecology values difference as an 
end in itself. This attitude extends to differences in 
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nature, between people, and to different potentialities 
within the individual self. 
Bookchin points out that in a hierarchical 
society, such as our own, severe constraints are put 
on "each individual's potentiality for consciousness, 
reason, selfhood, creativity, and the right to assert 
full control over her or his daily life.n16 Bookchin 
refers to the ''abortion of each individual's poten-
tiality" as a warping of "destiny."17 He calls for an 
extension of our notion of freedom "beyond any 
concept we have held of this notion in the past."18 In 
other words, we must not only recognize the un-
freedom which results from class hierarchy, we must 
also recognize the unfreedom which is created by 
hierarchy and domination in any form. To liberate 
the individual self, every level of experience--per-
sonal, political, economic, ecological, etc.--must be 
freed of domination. In this way, each individual 
human can be free to discover his or her own poten-
tial and pursue her or his own choices: to "manage" 
his or her own life and act directly upon it. 19 For 
Bookchin, then, "self-realization" is not achieved 
through an expanded conception of the self, as in 
deep ecology, but through an expanded conception of 
freedom. 
Bookchin criticizes the capitalist notion of 
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individualism, which "does not produce individualsw 
but competing "atomized egoists. "20 He suggests that 
the social ecology understanding of individual self-
actualization "presupposes existential relations with 
others of a like kind who are loving and mutually 
supportive."21 Individual freedom exists in a social 
r ealm, and thus, does not become "privatized hedon-
ism."22 
While recognizing that the individual is 
grounded in the human community and in nature, 
Bookchin feels there is a danger in suggesting a 
blurring of the boundaries between self and the 
surrounding context. He suggests that identification 
with a single universal "Self' leads to passivity and 
openness to outside manipulation. He suggests that 
it is only from the perspective of conscious recognition 
of ourselves as different from nature that we can 
choose to redevelop our connection to nature. 
Bookchin explains that in his view "humanity had to 
be expelled from the Garden of Eden to attain the 
fullness of its humanness." 23 He suggests that, while 
it was the dissolution of "early humanity's mutual 
reciprocity with the natural world" that led to today's 
environmental problems, this dissolution also Jed to 
the achievement of a "rich wealth of mind, 
personality, technical insight, culture, and self-
reflective thought.• Thus, for Bookchin, humanity's 
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"separation" from nature was a necessary step in 
social evolution. To return to the past, or to limit 
any of the choices open to modem humans (even 
when the limitation seems based on ecological 
necessity) would be to impose unfreedom and limit 
human potentiality: 
To leave humanity's latent capacity for 
actualizing the fullness of reason, 
creativity, freedom, personality and a 
sophisticated culture only partially or one-
sidedly fulfilled is to deny the rich 
dialectic of the human condition in its full 
state of realization and even of nature as 
life rendered self-conscious. 24 
This warning brings out two important aspects 
of the social ecology definition of self: the notion 
(already discussed) that self-realization is linked to 
individual freedom of choice, and the notion that 
humanity, through the evolution of mind, is "nature 
rendered self-conscious." The idea that humanity is 
nature rendered self-conscious is linked to the social 
ecology understanding of natural evolution. For 
Bookchin, the goal of natural evolution is the develop-
ment of increasing complexity and diversity cul-
minating in the development of the human mind: 
nature moving in a cumulative thrust 
toward ever-greater complexity, ever-
greater subjectivity, and finally ever-
greater mind with a capacity for 
conceptual thought, symbolic communica-
tion of the most sophisticated kind, and 
self-consciousness in which natural evolu-
tion knows itself purposively and wilful-
ly.25 
For Bookchin, humans are this complex mind, 
this self-consciousness through which natural evolu-
tion knows itself. He suggests that consciousness 
gives humanity both the ability to wipe out nature's 
diversity (as we are currently doing) or to nourish it 
(as we would in an "ecological" society). Thus, social 
evolution is now capable of joining with natural 
evolution in the project of creating greater and great-
er diversity. The self-actualization of nature can then 
become informed by human consciousness. It is 
through this active symbiosis that humanity and 
nature become "reharmonized" for social ecologists, 
not through any "mystical and passive" merging of 
the human self with nature. 
For ecofeminism, an understanding of the self 
involves the recognition that in patriarchal culture 
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the "authentic self' has been defined as male, and the 
female has been used as the symbol representing 
what the authentic self must overcome. Rosemary 
Radford Ruether explains that in the dominant 
understanding the self is divided into the "masculine" 
ego and the "feminine" unconscious. 26 The charac-
teristics associated with the ego (initiative, reason, the 
capacity for autonomy and what our culture has 
deemed "higher virtues") make up the "authentic" self 
in our society over and against the qualities of the 
unconscious self (passivity, sensuality, irrationality 
and dependency) . Ruether traces the development of 
negative female imagery and its internalization in the 
split human psyche, and calls for a healing process 
which takes into account the different healing needs 
of men and women in Western culture. 
Ruether points out the significance of sexual 
symbolism to an understanding of the construction of 
self and of the dominant reality in general: 
Sexual symbolism is foundational to 
the perception of order and relation-
ship that has been built up in cul-
tures. The psychic organization of 
consciousness, the dualistic view of 
the self and the world, the hierarchi-
cal concept of society, the relation of 
humanity and nature, and of God and 
creation--all these relationships have 
been modelled on sexual dualism. 27 
Ruether suggests that originally female sym-
bolism was positive. Societies which interacted daily 
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with nature and were directly dependent on nature 
for survival recognized that they were the children of 
the earth, which was represented by a mother-god-
dess. However, gradually this positive symbolism was 
subverted into negative symbolism as the importance 
of women's role as life-giver and centre of the family-
centred economy gave way to the growing power of 
the male sphere of politics, economics (now pulling 
away from the home), and the military. At the same 
time, dependence on nature was also being rejected, 
and nature too was taking on negative symbolism. 
The traditions Western culture eventually 
inherited were those of patriarchy and dualism. 
These two traditions came together in the dualistic 
experience of self and body, and of transcendent plane 
and material world, which projected the lower half of 
each dualism onto the sexual other--woman. The 
repressive view of the alien female is also "the model 
for the inferiorization of other subjugat ed groups, 
lower classes, and conquered races."28 The "other" is 
required as the antithesis over which "authentic" 
(male) selfhood is defmed and the position of the 
male elite is justified. 
Thus, in Western culture, Ruether summarizes: 
consciousness arose in a one-sided, an-
tagonistic way by making one half of 
humanity, not the partner in the struggle, 
but the symbol of the sphere to be trans-
cended and dominated. . . . The psycho-
dynamics of self-knowledge have been 
spurred by negation of, rather than 
cooperation with, the "other."29 
While deep ecology and social ecology recognize 
the limitations our culture has put on the develop-
ment of certain human capacities and potentials, 
ecofeminism points out the crucial role female sym-
bolism and the repression of women has played in 
this limitation. Thus, in order for self-realization to 
occur for either sex, women (and that part of the self 
associated with femaleness and nature) must be freed 
from negative imagery and subjugation. This does 
not mean a revalorization of the old mother-nature or 
goddess symbolism. Woman must cease to be a 
symbol for anything, positive or negative, and instead 
each woman must be recognized as an individual 
containing all the possibilities of personhood. 
For ecofeminism, self-realization can not occur 
without a reconstruction of relationships based on 
muted conceptions of mutualism and integration: 
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Women seek a reconstruction of 
relationships for which we have 
neither words nor models: a reconstr-
uction which can give each person the 
fullness of their being stolen from 
them by false polarization . . . Auth-
entic relationship is not a relation 
between two half selves, but between 
whole persons, when suppression and 
projection cease to distort the en-
counter. We seek a new concept of 
relationships between persons, groups, 
life systems, a relationship which is 
not competitive or hierarchical but 
mutually enhancing." 30 
Ruether explains that at this point in our 
culture the development of wholeness must move in 
opposite directions for men and for women. While 
men need to recover their repressed "female" uncon-
scious, women need to nurture their repressed ration-
ality, autonomy, and self-defmition. 31 While deep 
ecology speaks to the dominant defmition of (male) 
self when it calls for a move away from the narrow 
defmition of self as ego, ecofeminism speaks to the 
muted and undefmed female self when it calls for a 
nurturing of ego and self-definition. When taken 
together with a recognition of the differing needs of 
male and female maturing selves, these two calls are 
complementary (provided they are not interpreted as 
in opposition). The move to broaden the male self 
to incorporate the other does not entail the elimina-
tion of the ego, while the move to strengthen the 
female ego does not entail the elimination of connec-
tion with the other or with the unconscious. What is 
required for wholeness is the dissolution of all hierar-
chical dualisms, and a balance of all human poten-
tialities rather than an emphasis on any one more 
than another: 
Without sex-role stereotyping, sex-
personality stereotyping would disap-
pear, allowing for genuine individua-
tion of personality. Instead of being 
forced into a mold of masculine and 
feminine "types," each individual could 
shape a complex whole from the full 
range of human psychic potential for 
intellect and feeling, activity and 
receptivity. 3 2 
Ruether suggests that a society no longer 
bent on "conquering the earth" might have more time 
for "cultivation of interiority, for contemplation, for 
artistic work that celebrated being for its own 
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sake."33 However, she also stresses that this 
individual interiority would not be cultivated at the 
expense of the community: 
It would be a cultivation of the self that 
would be at one with an afftrmation of 
others, both our immediate neighbours 
and all humanity and the earth itself, as 
the "thou" with whom "!" am in a state of 
reciprocal interdependence.34 
Social ecology, deep ecology and ecofeminism 
all express concern over the limitation and distortion 
of the self which occurs in the dominant culture. In 
our hierarchical society certain human potentialities 
(for experience, thought and feeling) are muted. In 
the transformations proposed by social ecologists, 
deep ecologists, and ecofeminists, each individual is 
theoreti:ally free to chose from the whole continuum 
of human potentialities. Dev&l.l and Sessions suggest 
a redefmition of the self so that self-Wlderstanding 
and self-realization include not just the individual self 
but also the extended self-in-nature (with the under-
standing that the larger Self is made up of a variety 
of individual selves). In other words, deep ecologists 
attempt to challenge the humanistic individualized 
conception of self on which our current way of look-
ing at the world is based (unfortunately, however, 
the metaphor of extended identity continues to imply 
that the individual self is the focus of care and iden-
tity, since it is only through extending the self that 
care and identification are extended). 
Bookcbin limits his defmition of self to the 
human individual, but calls for a new, complementary 
understanding of the relationships between the indivi-
dual self and others, including nonhuman nature (he 
presents no challenge to the ideology of humanism). 
Ruether suggests that the potentialities which 
have been muted in women differ from those which 
have been muted in men. While men may need to 
nurture their sense of connection to others, women 
may need to nurture their sense of self-defmition. 
In general Ruether, like Bookchin, suggests that a 
new harmony between humanity and nature will 
come about through a reconstruction of the relation-
ships between humans and nonhuman nature, rather 
than through a redefmition of the self to include the 
nonhuman as deep ecology suggests (however, ecofe-
minist Elizabeth Dodson Gray does explicitly suggest 
that a larger sense of self is needed which entails a 
larger self-interest encompassing the non-human 
world). 
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All three celebrate the possible uniqueness of 
human consciousness, but each draws slightly dif-
ferent implications from this uniqueness. Deep 
ecology, in a sense, draws no implications. In other 
words, deep ecology celebrates human consciousness 
and leaves it at that. It does not assume that human 
consciousness means anything in particular for the 
rest of nature. Deep ecology assumes a position of 
humility regarding our ability, as humans, to under-
stand the rest of nature, let al• JOe know what is best 
for nature. Social ecology, on the other hand, draws 
the implication that human consciousness can and 
should work for the rest of nature, and that because 
humans are "nature rendered selfconscious" they can 
know what nature wants and needs, and can act 
more effectively on nature's behalf than can nature 
itself (humans can rehabilitate damaged ecosystems, 
for example, more quickly than natural processes). 
This view advocates one kind of "freedom" for humans 
and another kind for nonhum.ans. 
Ecofeminism seems to fall more in the middle 
between deep ecology and social ecology. Ruether 
criticizes the tendency to elevate consciousness to 
"supernatural apriority," recognizing that our identity 
is also gained through embodiment, yet, like Book-
chin, she suggests that humans can make nature into 
a "garden," implying humans have the understanding 
and moral justification to alter and "improve" na-
ture.35 While her confidence in human consciousness 
and its ability to successfully "cultivate" nature is 
similar to Bookchin's, her description of human 
consciousness as continuous with the "radical energy 
of matter throughout the universeft 36 has similarities 
to the deep ecology conception of continuity between 
humans and the rest of nature. Like deep ecologists, 
Ruether recognizes the possibility of experiencing a 
spiritual continuity with other beings and with nature 
as a whole. 
The visions of self expressed by social ecolog-
ists, deep ecologists, and ecofeminists accomplish two 
things: they point to the limitations of the dominant 
Western conception of self, and in so doing, they 
enable us to see possibilities which have been repres-
sed or unrealized in our cultural conceptions of self. 
Each may have problems and limitations which 
require critical attention, but their promise lies, not 
in their speciflc outlines of potential self, but in their 
challenge to our current conceptions of self. What 
emerges from the positions when taken together is a 
concept of being which aff:t.rms the individual self and 
is at the same time rooted in a context of relation-
ships and interdependence. 
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The Moral Status of Animals: 
ETHICAL CROSSROADS, DEAD ENDS AND THE ROAD NOT TAKEN 
If ethical thinking is an evolutionary process, as 
Aldo Leopold, the father of modem environmental 
ethics, thought it was, 1 then today we stand at a 
crossroads in that discipline. Or is it instead, a dead 
end? For thousands, if not tens-of-thousands of 
years, human beings have despotically ruled the rest 
of the animal kingdom. Believing ourselves to be 
superior, other species were categorized as existing 
"merely as a means to an end,"2 a human end, that 
is. Animals, other than humans, held no moral 
status.3 
Amidst growing lists of extinct and endangered 
species, this view has been philosophically attacked 
with increasing vigor since the 1970's. It brings into 
play the question of what the status of animals is, as 
well as what the role of humanity is in its relation-
ship to them. This paper will examine these ques· 
tions from the ethical standpoint of three current 
theories which attempt to establish the moral status 
of animals. It will argue that: traditional ethical 
foundations, as expressed in Tom Regan's rights view 
and Peter Singer's utilitarian theory, cannot be 
logically extended to include animals, based as they 
are, on atomistic and anthropocentric starting points; 
and that, although the holistic approach of Aldo 
Leopold attempts to break new ethical ground, the 
radical shift in thinking it entails, carries us beyond 
the realm of ethics altogether. 
"Ethical theories attempt to specify what 'the 
right reasons' are for judging acts right, wrong and 
obligatory."4 This seems a simple enough statement, 
but there is so much disagreement on the foundations 
for an ethical theory as it applies to non-humans, that 
the task of finding one appears doomed from the 
start. Tom Regan, for example, upholds a rights view 
and bases his theory on considered beliefs or reflect-
ive intuition: 
* 
We are to begin by considering our pre-
reflective intuitions--those beliefs about 
right and wrong that we happen to have. 
by Nancy O'Sullivan • 
We then make a conscientious effort 
to make the best review of these 
judgments we can, and we do this by 
striving to purge our thoughts of 
inconsistency and unquestioned par· 
tiality, and by thinking as rationally 
and coolly as we can, with maximum 
conceptual clarity and on the basis of 
the best relevant information we can 
muster. Those moral beliefs we bold 
after we have made an honest effort 
to meet these requirements are our 
considered beliefs, our reflective in· 
tutions, and any ethical theory that 
fails to match our considered beliefs, 
in a broad range of cases, cannot be 
reasonably judged the best theory, all 
considered. 5 
Peter Singer, however, disagrees with this 
position: "Our moral convictions are not reliable data 
for testing ethical theories. We should work from 
sound theories to practical judgments, not from our 
judgments to our theories. "6 His utilitarian position 
is based on the principle of equality: " ... the interests 
of every being that has interests are to be taken into 
account and treated equally with the like interests of 
any other being."7 
These positions both follow from traditional 
ethical starting points. Others, such as those propos-
ed by Paul Taylor and Aldo Leopold attempt to forge 
new paths in ethical theory and to establish the 
moral status of animals within a wider context. 
Taylor8 broadens his scope to include all living things 
and bases his theory on an attitude of respect for life: 
... the biocentric outlook recommends 
itself as an acceptable system of 
concepts and beliefs to anyone who is 
clearminded, unbiased, and factually 
enlightened, and who has a developed 
capacity of reality awareness with 
Nancy O'Sullivan is a former philosophy student and TA at Brock University. She ia currently in between degrees 
and living aomewbere in a Carolin i an wood. 
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regard to the lives of individual organ-
isms. This, I submit, is as good a reason 
for making the moral commitment in-
volved in adopting the attitude of respect 
for nature as any theory of environmental 
ethics could possibly have. 9 
Aldo Leopold's 'Land Ethic' similarly embraces 
the entire 'biotic comml.Ulity,' but it goes even fur-
ther by requiring a fundamental shift in thinking. 
Commenting on Leopold's book A Sand County 
AIUI8nac, John Rodman says of the 'Land Ethic': 
... we cannot simply abstract from the last 
part of this carefully-composed book the 
notion of extending ethics to the land and 
its inhabitants. The land ethic emerges 
in the course of the book as an integral 
part of a sensibility developed through 
observation, participatory experience, and 
reflection. It is an 'ethic' in the almost 
forgotten sense of a 'way of life'. For this 
reason it would be pretentious to talk of 
a land ethic until we have let our curio-
sity follow the skunk as it emerges from 
hibernation, listened with wonder at the 
calls of the wild geese arriving at the 
pond, sawed the fallen ancient tree while 
meditating its history, shot a wolf (once) 
and looked into its eyes as it died, recog-
nized the fish in ourselves, and strained 
to see the world from the perspective of 
a muskrat eye-deep in the swamp only to 
realize that in the end the mind of the 
muskrat holds for us a mystery we cannot 
fathom. 10 
Essentially, the theories offered for the moral 
status of animals fall into two camps--those that 
follow traditional ethics, and those that do not. The 
traditional positions of rights and utilitarianism tend 
to focus on the animals themselves, in an attempt to 
fit them into ethical structures designed for human 
beings; while those of thinkers like Taylor and Leo-
pold focus attention on our thinking and attempt to 
create new ethical frameworks designed to encompass 
a wider understanding of our application of moral 
status for animals and for the environment generally. 
In order to assess the relative merits and difficulties 
of such theories, and to determine their viability, a 
closer examination of the fundamental arguments in 
Regan, Singer and Leopold will follow. 
The theory that human beings possess certain 
natural and inalienable rights (such as rights to life, 
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liberty and the pursuit of happiness) gained wide 
acceptance at the time of the French and American 
revolutions and as a result were embodied in their 
constitutions. It remains today even more widely 
accepted, as is implied in the United Nations Decla-
ration of Human Rights. 11 
If it can be established that animals have 
natural rights in the same way human beings have, 
then it follows that we have certain obligations and 
duties toward them. If, for example, the chicken in 
my coop has a right to life in the same way my 
neighbours have, then I am obliged not to kill that 
chicken and eat it for dinner, just as I am obliged not 
to kill my neighbours and make a meal of them. 
The question, however, of whether or not 
human beings truly possess natural or moral rights 
(no matter how widely accepted) is itself a difficult 
one. Philosophers such as Jeremy Bentham argue 
that the right to life and other rights are ~ rights. 
The existence of moral or natural rights "is simple 
nonsense; natural and imprescriptable rights, rhetori-
cal nonsense--nonsense upon stilts."12 
Nevertheless, those who support the popular 
view (influenced largely by Immanuel Kant) that "all 
persons (that is all rational, autonomous individuals) 
have a distinctive kind of value, a l.Ulique worth or 
dignity,'' 13 believe that rights exist for individuals 
based on their nature as such: 
... moral rights follow directly from our 
recognition of persons as direct objects 
of moral concern, as entities worthy of 
moral consideration, as loci of intrin-
sic value, or, in Kant's terminology, 
as ends in themselves... human be-
ings have moral rights in virtue of 
being moral objects, these rights fol-
low from their nature ... 14 
Moral rights, therefore, belong to moral agents by 
virtue of the fact that they have l.Ulique inherent 
value. 
The case for animal rights, as Tom Regan 
argues it in The Case For Animal Rights, attempts to 
place (at least some) animals within this moral 
framework. Regan chooses a rights view because in 
his mind it best meets with the requirements for a 
valid ethical theory, that is, it conforms with our 
institutions, and 
(1) systematizes the maximum num-
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her of our considered beliefs, thereby 
having maximum scope; (2) systematizes 
them in a coherent fashion, thereby 
achieving consistency; (3) does this with-
out compromising the degree of precision 
it is reasonable to expect and require of 
any moral principle(s); (4) and satisfies 
these other criteria of evaluation while 
making the fewest possible assumptions 
necessary to do so, thereby meeting the 
criteria of simplicity. 15 
The task for Regan is to demNlstrate that 
animals, like humans, are objects of moral concern 
and therefore possess basic moral rights. His rights 
view states that all moral agents and patients have 
moral rights which are natural, inalienable, universal 
and equal. 16 Hence, the first several chapters of 
Regan's book are devoted to establishing animals as 
moral patients. A moral patient is distinct from a 
moral agent in that the latter is capable of perform-
ing right or wrong acts as well as experiencing the 
consequences of others' actions. Normal adult hum-
an beings are moral agents. Moral patients, how-
ever, can neither do right or wrong, but they can be 
on the receiving end of the actions of moral agents. 17 
Very young children and mentally handicapped 
individuals are examples of moral patients. "We have 
reason to regard" these humans, Regan argues, 
"as ... moral patientf s] on all fours, so to speak, with 
an1Jnals."18 
The establishment of animals as moral patients 
is arrived at by way of a rather thorough examin-
ation of their mental lives, which concludes that at 
least some animals (mammalian animals of a year or 
more) have fairly complex and sophisticated mental 
lives as well as experiential lives, comparable in many 
ways to those of human beings: 
Both animals and humans have prefer-
ence--and welfare--interests, some biolog-
ical, some psychological, some social: both 
are capable of acting intentionally in 
pursuit of what they want; both may be 
benefitted or harmed and, if the latter, 
harmed either because of what they are 
made to experience (harms as inflictions) 
or because of what they are denied 
(harms as deprivations); both have lives 
that are characterized by pleasure or pain, 
satisfaction or frustration; and the overall 
tone or quality of the life of each, to a 
greater or lesser degree, is a function of 
the harmonious satisfaction of those pref-
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erences that it is in the interests of 
each to have satisfied.19 
The argument following from this must deter-
mine whether or not moral patients are owed duties 
or obligations by moral agents directly. This involves 
Regan in showing that the principle that it is wrong 
to harm an object of moral concern, whether agent or 
patient, conforms with our reflective intuitions. It is 
wrong to harm animals becat.se as moral patients 
they possess inherent value. "lf ... we postulate in-
herent value in the case of moral agents, then we 
cannot non-arbitrarily deny it of moral patients."20 
This postulate, however, needs theoretical 
support which is offered by the 'subject-of-a-life 
criterion': 
Individuals are subjects of a life if 
they are able to perceive and remem-
ber; if they have beliefs, desires, and 
preferences; if they are sentient and 
have an emotional life; if they have a 
sense of their own future; if they have 
a psychological identity over time; and 
if they have an individual experiential 
welfare that is logically independent 
of their utility for, and the interests 
of, others. 21 
Animals as understood according to Regan's 
analysis of them clearly meet this criterion and 
therefore possess inherent value. Following from 
this, in keeping with "the formal principle of just-
ice ... we are required to give equal respect to those 
who have equal inherent value, whether they be 
moral agents or moral patients, and if the latter, 
whether they be humans or animals."22 We can 
therefore account for our direct duty not to harm 
animals, by the principle that they are owed respect 
as individuals who possess inherent value. 23 "Regan 
concludes ... [on the basis of his fmdings] that it is 
wrong to raise animals for food, to hunt or trap 
them, commercially or for sport, and to use them for 
research."24 
Several objections have been raised against 
Regan's theory, both specifically and more generally 
against any theory that attempts to ascribe or extend 
moral rights to animals. The flrst entails a logical 
problem. In spite of Regan's appeal to rational 
thinking and conceptual clarity, the basis of his 
theory is intuition. He moves from the "considered 
belief'' that because a moral patient ~ in possession 
of inherent value, he/she/it ought to have respect 
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and therefore rights. But there is no logical con-
nection between the fact that animals have inherent 
value and the judgment that they ought to have 
rights. The logical gap between statements of fact 
and decisions or judgments about the future (or what 
should be) has been a problem in moral theory since 
Hume drew attention to it in the mid-eighteenth 
century. In fairness to Regan, he has acknowledged 
this obstacle in his theory, but one critic has said "It 
is difficult to see how we could have a useful notion 
of inherent value without f:trst solving these tradition-
al ~oblems of moral the.ocy,"25 
Furthermore, as Michael Fox has pointed out, 
the realm of moral institutions is a uniquely human 
one: "since the only species we know of that has 
developed the notions of rights and obligations (and 
the institutions associated with them) is Homo 
sapiens, there must be something about this peculiar 
sort of social being that accounts for the phenom-
enon ... "26 Extending moral rights to animals, there-
fore, does not in any real sense provide them with 
moral status as, say, extending basic rights to Blacks 
and women does. It would however change our 
moral status in r elationship to them, by extending 
and increasing our duties and obligations to others-
-a move some think will only serve to denegrate and 
weaken the legitimate human rights movement. 27 
Finally, one last objection to Regan's theory is 
in order before moving on to Peter Singer's argu-
ment. It is a somewhat surprising charge against his 
anthropocentrism. It is surprising because Regan 
himself does not recognize it. His f:tght, as he puts it, 
is against " ... human chauvinism--the conceit that we 
(humans) are so very special that we are the only 
conscious inhabitants on the face of the earth."28 But 
Regan's analysis of the inherent value of animals is 
"decidely anthropocentric."29 Their value is not 
determined by what is characteristically theirs, 
instead they are compared with human beings to 
determine whether they share with us the qualities 
that give us value. Those who share with humans 
enough of the required characteristics for inherent 
value are afforded rights ("mentally normal mammals 
of a year or more"), 30 those who do not, are denied 
rights. 
Paul Taylor agrees that a rights-based view is 
anthropocentric: "It would be less misleading if we 
simply dropped the language of moral rights concern-
ing [animals] ... because the language of moral rights 
has come to be well-established in our assertions 
about the rights of persons, especially in f:trst person 
assertions about our own rights."31 In criticism of 
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our treatment of animals, Regan comments, "You 
don't change unjust institutions by tidying them 
up,"32 and it may well be that we can not change a 
traditional rights view by 'tidying it up' either. 
Peter Singer's perspective on the moral status 
of animals disagrees with a view (such as Regan's) 
which ascribes rights (to animals Q! humans) accord-
ing to a list of required qualities: "Our concern for 
others must not depend on whether they possess 
certain characteristics."33 Rather, Singer agrees with 
Jeremy Bentbam'a llQsition in hls concern for ani-
mals: ''The question is not, Can they reason? nor Can 
they talk? but Can they suffer?"34 
The task for Singer then, in establishing the 
moral status of animals, is to determine whether or 
not they suffer, for: 
If a being suffers, there can be no 
moral justification for refusing to take 
that suffering into consideration, and, 
indeed, to count it equally with the 
like suffering (if rough comparisons 
can be made) of any other being. 35 
As a utilitarian, Singer is concerned with the 
equal interests of all sentient beings, whether they be 
animal or human, and in particular, with their equal 
interest in being free from suffering. 36 Moral agents 
are duty-bound in his view to ensure the least am-
ount of suffering and the greatest amount of pleasure 
for all beings concerned. 
If it can be demonstrated, for example, that 
animals raised on factory farms as food for human 
consumption, or animals used in psychological ex-
perimentation and toxicity research, are all suffering 
under these circumstances, then these practices are 
morally wrong and human beings are obliged to stop 
them. 
In his article "Animal Liberation," Singer 
argues at great length against these practices on the 
grounds that the animals involved suffer. In his 
mind there is no doubt that animals can, and do, 
suffer: 
Nearly all the external signs which 
lead us to infer pain in other humans 
can be seen in other species, especial-
ly 'higher' animals such as mammals 
and birds. Behavioural signs--writh-
ing, yelping, or other forms of calling, 
attempts to avoid the source of pain, 
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and many others-are present. We know 
too that these animals are biologically 
similar in the relevant respects, having 
nervous systems like ours which can be 
observed to function as ours do.37 
The argument that only human beings with the 
use of a developed language feel pain is dismissed by 
Singer, primarily on the grounds that use of language 
has nothing to do with feeling pain. Ability for 
conceptual thought and having intention are not 
required in order to feel pain, as is the case with 
human infants, and the fact that someone can say 
they are in pain is not a definite indication that they 
truly are. Hence, Singer accepts that "behavioural 
signs and knowledge of the animal's biological simi-
larity to ourselves together provide adequate evidence 
that animals do suffer."38 
So far, Singer's argument for the moral status 
of animals seems simple enough: we know that 
animals suffer; suffering is against a being's interests; 
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as beings that suffer, animals have an interest in 
being free from suffering; we as moral agents must 
therefore act to reduce animal suffering as much as 
possible. 
Not as simple is the question: Which animals 
suffer? Do they all, insects included? Singer deter-
mines that some animals suffer because they share 
with us a like nervous system which can stimulate 
pain response, and a similar brain capacity for 
negative feelings and emotions such as fear, anxiety 
and stress.39 Now, "it remains to consider how far 
down the evolutionary scale this analogy holds."40 
All mammals and birds, who share with hu-
mans the most anatomical and behavioral similarit-
ies, definitely do suffer and are therefore conscious. 
For all vertebrates (reptiles and fish) "the analogies 
are sufficiently close to suppose that they too possess 
consciousness,"4 1 although the analogy does grow 
weaker the further down the evolutionary scale we 
go. Crustaceans, for example, make the list of con-
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scious beings, aware of the pain they suffer and with 
an interest in being free of it, and therefore have 
moral status. But oysters, because they lack a 
sufficiently complex nervous system, probably do not 
feel pain and are therefore not conscious of suffering 
in any sense.42 "Oysters," as one commentator on 
Singer has put it, "so different from us, are fair game 
for the gumbo." 43 
This, in essence, is Singer's theory. "Straight-
forward" as it is, he hoped it would have wide appeal 
and increase public awareness, but he also admits to 
using this line of argument because he was more 
certain about the wrongness of suffering than he was 
about the issue of killing animals. His continued 
defense of the practicality of a moral theory based on 
the capacity for suffering is cleverly underlined in a 
recent paper entitled "Animals and the Value of Life". 
In this paper, Singer seeks to address the wrongness 
of taking animal life by adopting and examining 
theories such as Regan's, which attempt to establish 
the value of animal life and thereby, their right to 
life. 
At the conclusion of the paper, his fmdings 
leave him no less uncertain on the issue of killing, 
indeed, the theoretical conclusions which his inquiry 
brings leave both Singer and the reader dismayed 
about the exact nature of the right to life. In order 
to determine the value of animal life, it must meet 
with certain criteria derived from the value of human 
life. These criteria amount, in Singer's estimation, to 
a status of personhood (one who is self-conscious and 
rational), a status which he argues must theoretically 
be denied some humans. Even a utilitarian approach 
cannot solidly establish a theory of a right to life, 
unless it can be shown that "the loss of pleasure 
caused by the killing of one being can [not) be made 
up for by the creation of another being."44 
The practical conclusion of this paper is that 
the issue of killing cannot be understood in isolation 
from the other realities, such as suffering, in a given 
situation. Animals that are killed for one reason or 
another, also suffer, through pain, or deprivation, or 
fear, or anxiety and so on. This knowledge should be 
our guiding principle in determining the moral status 
of animals. "To maintain that the lives of most 
animals are of less value than the lives of most 
humans is not to excuse what humans do to animals 
or to diminish the urgency of the struggle to end the 
callous exploitation of other species by our own."45 
A serious objection raised against Singer's 
theory, is really a criticism of utilitarianism in gen-
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eral. Although its great appeal lies in its un-
compromising egalitarianism, the kind of equality it 
applies is not the sort extended to individuals them-
selves, but rather to the sum total of individual 
interests. The consequences of moral acts are what 
count. The goal of utilitarianism is to bring about 
the best balance of satisfied interests over dissatisfied 
interests. That one or a few individuals (or many as 
the case may be) will be left with dissatisfied inter-
ests, is a consequence utilitarianism accepts. 
For this reason utilitarianism is criticized as 
being "incompatible with the ideal ofjustice,"46 which 
is based on individual rights. "Utilitarianism has no 
room for the moral rights of different individuals 
because it has no room for their equal inherent value 
or worth."47 
Used as a basis for the moral status of 
animals, such a view toward animal interests is 
bound to come into insurmountable conflict with 
individual rights, particularily those of human beings 
whose rights are also protected by law. Such conflicts 
have already arisen between animal welfare groups 
and researchers and would be dramatically intensified 
if all meat producers and, indeed all individual meat 
eaters, suddenly interpreted their rights as being 
violated. 
Singer's theory does not go far enough, there-
fore, in establishing solid ground for the moral status 
of animals. This, of course, may not deny the moral 
validity of his position, but it does indicate the serious 
difficulty one would have in adopting it as a workable 
ethic. 
Another objection, more particular to Singer's 
theory, is of the same variety as raised against 
Regan's rights view, namely, that it is anthropocentr-
ic. Once again the criticism is surprising, because 
Singer spells out specifically that speciesism, defmed 
as "a prejudice or attitude of bias toward the interests 
of members of one's own species and against those of 
members of other species,''48 is the main target of his 
arguments. 49 
But while Regan makes mental analogies to 
humans, Singer refers to human behavioural and 
biological analogies as his measure of whether a 
particular species suffers and therefore qualifies as 
having moral status. 
It is surprising in fact, that Singer does not 
recognize in some of his statements, his own brand of 
prejudice: 
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It is not arbitrary to hold that the life of 
a self-aware being, capable of abstract 
thought, of planning for the future, of 
complex acts of communication, and so 
on, is more valuable than the life of a 
being without these capacities. 50 
As David Quammen has said of both Singer 
and Regan: "Make no mistake: Man [sic] is still the 
measure, for Singer and Regan .... Instead of asking Is 
the creature a human?, they simply ask How similar 
to human is similar enough?"51 This sa>:11e critic has 
also said of these men, that they "show some shock-
ing limitations ofvision." 52 In fairness to both Regan 
and Singer, I think the true limitations of their 
attempts to formulate a workable ethic in regard to 
animals, stem from the traditional foundations of 
their theories. 
Both men are locked into traditional frame-
works conceived primarily to guide human individuals 
and human relationships. As a result, both are 
anthropocentric at their roots, and both are too 
narrowly focused on either individual rights or ind-
ividual interests (albeit as a collectivity), and fail to 
address the problem within the wider context in 
which it exists. Bryan G. Norton sums up the most 
critical objection to both Regan's and Singer's theo-
ries, their 'moral atomism,' and suggests the need for 
a wider vision: 
The animal liberation movement is based 
upon an analogy between human and 
animal suffering and its main thrust is 
not to provide a means to adjudicate 
between conflicting demands that human 
individuals make on the environment, but 
rather it introduces a whole new category 
of demands--the demands of animals. 
... Expanding the number and type of 
rights holders does not address the prob-
lem of which individual claims have prior-
ity over others--it only increases these 
demands and makes it more and more 
difficult to satisfy them. The basic prob-
lem, then, lies precisely in the emphasis 
on individual claims and interests. An en-
vironmental ethic must support the holis-
tic functioning of an ongoing system. 53 
Holistic theories have responded to the recog-
nition that traditional ethics meet with too many 
limitations when applied to animals and the environ-
ment generally. They represent a movement that is 
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calling for a new way of doing ethics; for a radical 
shift in "our ideas about what kinds of action are 
moral and which are criminal." 54 They also require 
a change in human values, what John Rodman refers 
to as a 'paradigm change,' brought about not by 
"exhortation, threat, or logic, but a rebirth of the 
sense of wonder that in ancient times gave rise to 
philosophers but is now more often found among field 
naturalists." 55 
Unlike Singer's and Rt::gan's views, holistic 
theories attempt to guide moral act1on within a much 
broader framework of relationships. The moral status 
of animals is established, not on the basis of their 
individual similarities to human beings, but according 
to their interdependence within the ecological com-
munity. 
Most proponents of 'ethical holism' have 
either been influenced or inspired by the classical 
expression of the theory found in a chapter entitled 
"The Land Ethic," in Aldo Leopold's A Sand County 
Almanac, written over forty years ago. Leopold's 
'land ethic' recognizes that all biological life thrives 
within a complex community of interdependence and 
that the natural systems in which they thrive (forests, 
oceans, mountains, swamps, etc.) are just as much a 
part of that interdependence as the life therein, and 
just as morally significant. Thus, the 'land ethic' 
"enlarges the boundaries of the [moral) community to 
include soils, waters, plants, and animals or collect-
ively, the land."56 
Viewed as a living organism in and of itself, 
the biotic community, as a whole (i.e. with all its 
constituent parts), becomes the object of moral con-
cern. Its healthy maintenance and welfare are there-
fore the measure of moral action: "A thing is right 
when it tends to preserve the integrity, stability, and 
beauty of the biotic community. It is wrong when it 
tends to do otherwise. "5 7 
This guiding principle, though simply stated, 
has wide ranging implications. It means, for example, 
that: endangered and rare species would be given 
preferential treatment because they contribute to the 
diversity and therefore stability of the community; 
certain species such as the honey bee, whose function 
in the natural economy is critical, would have a 
greater claim to moral attention, than say a rabbit or 
a mole; hunting of certain species in certain areas 
may be morally obligatory in order to offset popu-
lation explosions; plant life, so important in many 
ways to the biosphere, would be protected; predators 
would be nurtured and preserved as valuable mem-
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bers of the community; and the human population 
would have to be brought nnder control. 58 
These implications, which only begin to scratch 
the surface, reflect the dramatic change in values 
necessary in order to implement the 'land ethic.' 
Individual and equal rights and interests in 'the land' 
would have to be abandoned. An attitude of respect 
for all life and for the community itself would be 
fundamental and imperative of all its members. Most 
importantly, the "land ethic changes the role of Homo 
sapiens from conqueror of the land community to 
plain member and citizen of it."59 
Leopold offers no logical arguments, in general, 
to support the proposal of his 'land ethic.' He 
believes that such an ethic is an 'ecological necessity' 
and in time will evolve "in the minds of a thinking 
community" requiring "love, respect, and admiration 
for land, and a high regard for its value. "60 
Logic and rationality appear to have little to do 
with the nnderstanding and acceptance of Leopold's 
ethic. As J. Baird Callicott has observed: 
Whatever the strictly logical connections 
between the concept of a social commun-
ity and a moral responsibility, there 
appears to be a strong psychological bond 
between that idea and conscience. Hence, 
the representation of the natural environ-
ment as, in Leopold's terms, "one humm-
ing community," ... brings into play, whe-
ther rationally or not, those stirrings of 
conscience which we feel in relation to 
delicately complex, functioning social and 
or~c systems.61 
John Rodman agrees that somehow, the grasp 
of the 'land ethic' defies logic: "such arguments could 
not persuade anyone who still looked at nature as if 
it were comprised of objects or mere resources, and 
such arguments are unnecessary for those who have 
come to perceive nature as composed of subjects."62 
This change in perception is necessary and is 
the key underpinning of the 'land ethic,' for with a 
sufficient change in our perception, respectful conduct 
will seem 'natural' and the means by which we have 
traditionally understood ethical consideration (as 
rights and duties) will no longer be required or 
indeed, have a place. 63 
As radical as this shift in thinking may be, in 
terms of ethical theory, its acclimation in our minds 
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is rather more subtle. John Rodman describes it as 
an 'ecological sensibility,' and in the following pass-
age eloquently describes how it unfolds during a 
reading of Leopold's book: 
[we are] invited to accompany Leopold 
as he follows the tracks of a skunk in 
the January snow, wondering where 
the skunk is heading and why; spec-
ulating on the different meanings of 
a winter thaw for the mouse whose 
snow burrow has collapsed and for 
the owl who has just made dinner of 
the mouse; trying to understand the 
honking of the geese as they circle the 
pond; and wondering what the world 
must look like to a muskrat eye-deep 
in the swamp. By the time one reach-
es Leopold's discussion of the land 
ethic, one has grown accustomed to 
thlnking of different animals and 
(arguably), by extention, different 
natural entities in general--as subjects 
rather than objects, as beings that 
have their own purposes, their own 
perspectives on the world, and their 
own goods that are differentially 
affected by events. While we can 
never get inside a muskrat's head and 
know exactly what the world looks 
like from that angle, we can be pretty 
certain that the view is different from 
ours. What melts away as we become 
intrigued with this plurality of per-
spectives is the assumption that any 
one of them (for example, ours) is 
privileged. 64 
With respect to the moral status of animals 
then, the 'land ethic' offers a kind of all or nothing 
proposition. If we are to accept its position on the 
moral status of animals, then we must accept its 
position on our moral standing and the moral stand-
ing of the environment as well. 
Once again, our traditions hamper us. Not 
only are our Western systems of moral philosophy 
anchored in logic and rational application, so too are 
our thought patterns and our entire World-view. 
Such a radical shift in the perception of the human 
experience strikes fear in the minds of those opposed 
to holistic theories and places them, not within the 
realm of ethics, but in a category with mysticism. 
One of the most frequent arguments against 
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holistic theory, is that it denies "claims, rights, inter-
ests, the value of the individual, and so on, "65 all of 
the foundations upon which traditional ethics are 
built. 
Some philosophers go so far as to interpret 
holism as being anti-human because it implies that 
"massive human diebacks would be good. It is our 
species' duty to eliminate 90 percent of our num-
bers, "66 they warn. In a similar vein, Tom Regan 
exaggerates the clash between what he terms 'en-
vironmental fascism' and the rights view, in this 
passage: 
If ... the situation we faced was either to 
kill a rare wildflower or a (plentiful) 
human being, and if the wildflower, as a 
'team member,' would contribute more to 
"the integrity, stability, and beauty of the 
biotic community" than the human, then 
presumably we would nQt be doing wrong 
if we killed the human and saved the 
wildflower. 67 
These arguments (and anxieties) illustrate the 
underlying principle objection to holism: that it is at 
best theoretically unclear, and at worst, incoherent as 
an ethical theory. Even in the minds of proponents, 
holism is considered "still-emergent."68 In their exist-
ing presentation, and this is especially true of Leo-
pold's 'land ethic,' they are interpreted by conser-
vative minds as being more akin to the 'primitive' 
North American native's respect for nature, 69 than to 
a comprehensible ethical system. AB such, their 
acceptance requires visionary thinking, a leap of faith, 
and a journey back to the starting point out of which 
our traditional ethics once grew. It is a task for 
scholars, Aldo Leopold says: 
Ability to see the cultural value of wilder-
ness boils down, in the last analysis, to a 
question of intellectual humility. The 
shallow-minded modem who has lost his 
[sic] rootage in the land assumes that he 
[sic] has already discovered what is im-
portant; it is such who prate of empires, 
political or economic, that will last a 
thousand years. It is only the scholar who 
appreciates that all of history consists of 
successive excursions from a single start-
ing point, to which man [sic] returns 
again and again to organize yet another 
search for a durable scale of values. It is 
only the scholar who understands why 
the raw wilderness gives defmition and 
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meaning to the human enterprise.70 
The fact that the 'land ethic' is not to be 
understood in logical terms, but rather as an evol-
utionary process of sensibility, involving more than 
just our reason, leaves it open to possibilities. But 
for the moment, the moral status of animals, as 
holistic theories would apply it, remains outside our 
current understanding of ethics and on a path of 
thought that we have yet to explore. 
Ultimately, the hinderance to assigning a 
moral status to animals stems from our limited 
framework of ethical understanding. Attempts by 
traditional rights and utilitarian theories to cross-
over from human to non-human application, ad-
mirable as they may be, are hampered by their 
anthropocentrism and their moral atomism. They 
attempt to logically apply moral status to animals and 
fail. There is no room within such narrow ethical 
systems for animals other than humans. Both Re-
gan's and Singer's theories lead us to dead ends. 
Holistic theories seek to address these limitat-
ions by taking us in a new direction, perhaps even 
returning us to a very ancient and fundamental 
understanding of ourselves and our place on this 
planet. They lead us, frighteningly, into the realms 
of an entirely different existence, beyond the bound-
aries of current ethical understanding. AB philosoph-
ers continue in their search for an ethical system 
that will include animals, they may discover that the 
fences of logic and reason no longer hold them, and 
that, as the pioneers of 'ethical holism' found, the 
future of ethics is on the road not taken. 
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